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The euro-area economy has entered a phase of 
stabilisation. Determined and concerted policy 
action successfully prevented the economy from 
falling into depression. Signs of improvement in 
the economic situation have become increasingly 
apparent since the start of this autumn. Growth 
in both Germany and France surprised on the 
upside in the second quarter and pulled the euro 
area up. More good news is likely to be in store 
as the global economic environment is 
improving, the inventory cycle is set to turn and 
further, already planned, discretionary policy 
measures are becoming effective. There is 
reason for caution, however.  
It is only a year ago that shock waves from 
financial markets inflicted the biggest shock to 
the global economy in post-war history. What is 
at stake now is the successful transition from 
still fragile recovery to self-sustained, durable 
growth and to avoid a protracted period of 
subdued growth. I see five issues that need 
careful consideration.  
First, the repair of the financial sector still 
remains unfinished business. We must seize the 
momentum of the recovery to complete the 
restoration of stable, competitive and efficient 
financial markets. This calls for further cleaning 
of impaired assets from balance sheets and the 
provision of additional capital if needed. The 
amounts potentially needed are high, but 
manageable as the results of the recent EU-wide 
stress-test have shown.  
The global economy is the second aspect I have 
in mind. The G-20 Heads of State and 
Government in Pittsburgh agreed to a new 
framework to rebalance global growth in an 
orderly manner. For deficit countries like the US 
this means supporting private savings, 
undertaking fiscal consolidation and avoiding 
protectionist measures. And for surplus 
economies like China it means the reorientation 
of attention from the tradable to the non-tradable 
sector. Such reorientation is highly welcome. 
But it can only be the result of a longer 
adjustment process. Together with our 
international partners we will have to ensure that 
this process moves forward and that the euro 
area, altogether broadly balanced, does not bear 
an unfair burden of adjustment.  
The third consideration relates to labour markets. 
While the full impact of the crisis on 
employment is yet to come, in a number of 
countries unemployment has increased less than 
expected given the severity of the crisis. As 
confidence in the recovery is gaining 
momentum, there is hope that in some Member 
States the rise in unemployment may be less 
marked than feared earlier this year. In particular 
those economies that undertook labour market 
reforms in line with the Lisbon strategy in the 
past may benefit from a faster turnaround in the 
labour market when the economy picks up. 
Others still have considerable work to do. The 
euro-area economy cannot afford to leave the 
newly unemployed permanently excluded from 
the labour force.   
Fourth, within the euro area the crisis has put the 
spotlight on important domestic economic 
imbalances which need correction. We analysed 
these aspects in depth in our EMU@10 report 
last year. In some Member States the correction 
ahead implies the downsizing and adjustment of 
oversized sectors, including in particular 
construction, but also the reduction of high 
private-sector debt and the adjustment of 
unsustainable current-account imbalances. It will 
take time for countries with entrenched current-
account deficits to restore competitiveness. But 
also current-account surplus economies face the 
need to undertake reforms in order to boost 
domestic demand. Euro-area members must 
embrace these challenges in a constructive and 
coordinated manner to ensure the euro area’s 
recovery is balanced and not a source of new 
distortions.  
Finally, we need to remain concerned about 
potential growth. If not adequately addressed, 
the protracted economic restructuring, the risk of 
rising structural unemployment, the fall in 
investment, and the likely higher financing costs 
for R&D and innovation will take their toll on 
growth and productivity growth in the years to 
come. We reported in detail about the potential 
impact of the crisis on growth potential in our 
June edition of the Quarterly Report on the Euro 
Area and concluded that policies matter. 
Ultimately, boosting potential growth is the aim 
of the EU 2020 Strategy put forward by 
President Barroso. 
So, what do these considerations mean for policy 
making at this juncture? First, we need to 
complete implementing the support measures for 
our economies. At this stage, much of the highly 
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welcome stabilisation of the economy is the 
result of the extraordinary public support put in 
place under the umbrella of the European 
Economic Recovery Plan. A premature policy 
withdrawal would jeopardise the still fragile 
recovery.  
At the same time, as highlighted in our recent 
European Economy report on "Economic Crisis 
in Europe", we need to start broadening our 
focus beyond short-term demand management to 
redress the supply-side forces of our economies. 
It is time to work out a comprehensive exit 
strategy from the crisis and the extraordinary 
fiscal, monetary and financial support provided 
to the economy. At the informal Ecofin meeting 
in Gothenburg on 1-2 October, Ministers started 
the discussion of a comprehensive policy 
strategy beyond the crisis. It is aimed at 
sustaining the recovery; ensuring fiscal 
sustainability; rebuilding a stable and viable 
financial sector; strengthening potential growth; 
and contributing to the tackling of macro-
economic imbalances. Structural reform, 
enhancing the quality of public finances and 
strengthening the incentives for raising the 
productive capacity of the economy will have to 
play a prominent role in our strategy for 
recovery.  
Public deficits have increased sharply in the 
course of the crisis, reflecting a combination of 
steep falls in revenues, the operation of 
automatic stabilisers, the stimulus measures 
undertaken and the financial market 
interventions. This has been the right choice. As 
a result, debt is rising fast. Eventually fiscal 
tightening will have to begin and to be sustained 
for a number of years to ensure a return to 
sustainable public finances.  
Key issues that require attention include the 
timing, intensity and sequencing of policy 
withdrawal. To be successful in this process, 
close coordination among Member States will be 
needed to ensure optimal cross-country 
differentiation but also cross-policy consistency. 
Withdrawal of the fiscal stimulus, accompanied 
by structural fiscal consolidation measures, 
would improve the conditions for price stability 
and so allow for an appropriate macroeconomic 
policy mix. Ambitious reforms of labour, 
product and financial markets are essential and 
should be an integral part of a consolidated exit 
strategy. The euro area faces specific 
coordination challenges in this context, given the 
stronger interdependences between its members.  
In this Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, we 
address some of the economic trends mentioned 
above. First, in assessing the economic situation, 
we take a look at the implications of a reduction 
in global current-account imbalances on the euro 
area. Besides the direct implications in the form 
of reduced export opportunities, the euro area 
may come under significant price pressure. 
Although the euro area as a whole did not 
contribute to the global imbalances, it will have 
to be part of the solution. The main task of 
policy makers is to bring structural reform 
forward with a view to fostering adjustment and 
boosting potential growth.  
In the Focus section, we investigate the slump in 
world trade and its implications for euro-area 
exports. World trade fell at a rate not seen since 
the Great Depression and much faster than world 
economic activity. This sharp fall can be related 
to the increased internationalisation of 
production chains, difficulties with trade finance 
and the strong impact of the recession on the 
demand for trade intensive goods, like 
investment in equipment. The slump had a 
strong impact on the euro area but the effect 
differed across Member States, depending on the 
size and structure of exports. Recent data point 
towards a stabilisation of world trade falls but 
the overall prospects remain subdued and euro-
area exports might not return to the dynamics 
recorded before the crisis. 
House-price and balance-sheet adjustments are a 
prominent feature of the current crisis. We show 
that the interaction between financial wealth, 
house prices and indebtedness plays a crucial 
role for euro-area household spending. There is 
evidence that mortgage debt had overshot prior 
to the crisis. The correction of this debt 
overhang, but also the fall of equity prices 
during the crisis, are taking their toll on 
consumption in the euro area. In the absence of 
further falls in asset prices, we expect these 
negative effects to progressively wear off, but 
tightening credit constraints remain a risk to 
consumption.  
The transition from today’s nascent recovery to 
sustained growth is a delicate balancing act. By 
addressing these challenges with determination 
the euro area has the potential to emerge 
stronger and more united from the crisis.  
MARCO BUTI 
DIRECTOR-GENERAL 
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1. Recent economic and financial 
developments (1) 
The situation in financial markets has improved 
during the last six months with risk premiums in 
money and credit markets declining and stock 
markets rising, partly reflecting unprecedented 
steps taken by central banks and governments. 
Several financial indicators have now reached 
pre-crisis levels. However, money and credit 
growth to enterprises and households remains 
subdued on the back of low asset prices and weak 
demand and more restrictive credit supply by 
financial institutions as rising loan defaults 
continue to weigh on banks’ balance sheets. All in 
                                                        
(1) The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue was 
1 October 2009. 
all, the recent stabilisation in financial markets 
appears to be fairly robust although the risk of a 
negative feedback loop from the real economy is 
still present, in particular if employment continues 
to deteriorate and the number of insolvencies 
continues to rise. 
Money and bond markets 
Conditions in euro-area money markets have 
improved markedly. The euro-area 3-month 
(unsecured) money market rate declined to around 
0.75 % by the end of September 2009, from 
1.11 % by the end of June 2009 and 5.39 % at the 
peak in October 2008. The low interest rate 
reflects easing global economic and financial risk 
perceptions as well as low policy rates and large 
liquidity injections by the ECB. However, the 
The euro area has entered a phase of stabilisation. But uncertainty about the strength and sustainability of the 
recovery remains. Important policy actions have allowed some stabilisation in the financial system and have 
provided support to economic activity during the last few months. The marked improvement in financial markets 
is reflected in declining risk premiums in money and credit markets and rising stock markets. Some financial
indicators have even come back to pre-crisis levels. Real economic activity also witnessed substantial 
improvement during the second quarter; growth only fell by 0.1 %. The slight contraction was driven by 
continued inventory adjustment and another fall in investment, though much more moderate than in previous 
quarters. Looking forward, there are signs that the economy is gathering positive momentum. The global 
economy seems to be picking up, the inventory cycle is set to turn and confidence continues to improve. These 
positive signs should, however, be seen in a context of high uncertainty, with in particular the full impact of the 
crisis on employment still to come. All in all, some further improvement will probably materialise in the third 
quarter but the sustainability of the recovery is not yet guaranteed. The Commission’s September interim 
forecast projects growth at 0.2 % and 0.1 % q-o-q respectively for 2009Q3 and 2009Q4 and, for 2009 as a 
whole, the fall remains unchanged at -4 %, compared to the spring forecast.       
Over the last decade, significant current-account imbalances have built up in the global economy. Some of these 
imbalances are now unwinding as a reaction to the economic and financial crisis. The unwinding is partly 
cyclical but also has some more durable features. Countries with large current-account deficits such as the US 
are likely to experience lasting downward pressures on demand as the private sector undergoes a protracted 
process of balance-sheet repair. The euro area has not contributed to the build-up of global imbalances but 
could be significantly affected by an asymmetric unwinding in deficit countries, where debt leads to a reduction 
in demand. In such a scenario, the euro area could face real exchange rate appreciation pressures. Structural 
reforms, such as service sector reforms, support adjustment inter alia by facilitating resource allocation from 
the tradable to the non-tradable sector. Moreover, stepped-up euro-area representation in global 
macroeconomic and financial affairs could contribute to facilitating an orderly adjustment of global imbalances. 
The interaction between net wealth and indebtedness plays an important role in the determination of household 
spending in the euro area. Past trends in savings can largely be explained by financial wealth effects and the 
interaction between credit constraints and house prices. Credit constraints translate into a positive link between 
savings and house prices: when house prices increase, households need to save more to pay for the share of 
their acquisition that is not covered by the mortgage. There is also evidence that mortgage debt had overshot the 
level determined by its fundamentals already before the onset of the financial crisis. The correction to this debt 
overhang and past sharp falls in equity prices are currently taking their toll on consumption in the euro area. In 
the absence of further falls in asset prices, these negative effects should, however, wear off progressively in 2010 
and give way to a gradual recovery of consumption. Nevertheless, a possible increase in credit constraints in the 
wake of the financial crisis still remains a serious risk to a consumption rebound. 
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very low money market rates (currently below the 
ECB’s 1 % interest rate on the main refinancing 
operations) also indicate that banks have a high 
liquidity preference and prefer to lend short term. 
Interbank spreads, measured as the difference 
between unsecured money market rates and risk-
free interest rates with similar maturity, have 
continued to decline during the last three months 
to levels only moderately above pre-crisis levels. 
The 3-month interbank spread was around 35 
basis points at the beginning of October 2009, 
which compares to nearly 200 basis points in mid-
October 2008. 
Graph I.1.1: Euro-area money market           
(in %, spread in pp — 1 Jan 2007 to 1 Oct 2009) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
German 10-year government bond yields have 
fallen considerably over the last three months, and 
they seem to embody a more cautious assessment 
of the growth outlook than that reflected in stock 
price developments over the same period. 
Moreover, sustained buying of government bonds 
by the banking sector and institutional investors 
may have supported bond prices, despite strong 
issuance. The 10-year Bund yield stood at 3.15 % 
by the beginning of October 2009, compared to 
3.38 % by the end of June 2009. Other euro-area 
government bond yields generally declined more 
strongly, implying that yield spreads on euro-
denominated government bonds relative to the 
German Bund narrowed amid lower risk aversion 
in general. However, these spreads still remain at 
high levels compared to the pre-Lehman situation. 
The spread is highest in Ireland (160 bps), Greece 
(137) and Malta (126). 
Financing costs decline further 
The overall cost of finance has declined in recent 
months, as retail lending rates have followed 
  
market interest rates on their downward path. 
Moreover, corporate bond yield spreads over the 
German Bund have narrowed since the beginning 
of 2009. In particular, spreads on the more risky 
bonds have declined significantly, with spreads on 
BBB-corporates down by nearly 90 bps during the 
last three months, to 174 bps. Spreads on AAA-
corporates recorded more limited declines of 
around 20 bps over the review period. The lower 
spreads reflected the decline in general risk 
aversion since March 2009. 
Graph I.1.2: Corporate bond spreads, euro area 
(in bps — 1 Jan 2007 to 1 Oct 2009) 
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Moreover, the ECB initiated its covered bond 
purchase programme in July 2009, in which euro-
denominated covered bonds for approximately 
EUR 60 billion were purchased. According to the 
programme, the bonds must be eligible for use as 
collateral for Eurosystem credit operations, have 
an issue volume of about EUR 500 million and 
have, as a rule, a minimum rating of AA by one or 
more of the main rating agencies.  
Graph I.1.3: Stock prices and implied volatility 
of stock prices  
(2 Jan 2007=100, 1 Jan 2007 to 1 Oct 2009) 
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By stimulating demand for corporate bonds, the 
programme added further to the narrowing of 
corporate bond spreads. Nevertheless, overall 
conditions in corporate bond markets still remain 
relatively tight compared to the pre-crisis 
situation. Euro-area equity prices have risen 
sharply in the last six months amidst evidence of 
an inflexion point in the business cycle and 
improved earnings results. Although stock prices 
retrenched somewhat in June and the first half of 
July, the Eurostoxx50 increased as of mid-July 
and onwards and by 1 October 2009 it was 55 % 
above its March 2009 trough. 
Graph I.1.4: Composite financial indicator, euro 
area (in %, Mar 2003 to July 2009) 
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The European Commission’s Composite Nominal 
Financing Cost Indicators (CFCI) for non-
financial euro-area corporations and households 
declined by around 1.5 pp. and 1 pp., respectively, 
since their peak in October 2008. For non-
financial corporations, the cost of bank loans, 
equity capital and market debt all declined thanks 
to lower interest rates, rising stock prices and 
narrowing corporate bond spreads. For 
households, the cost of all types of loans 
continued to decline as both retail and market 
interest rates fell further. As a result, the July 
CFCI for households stood at its lowest level 
since December 2006. 
Credit growth still subdued 
Money and credit growth continued to decline 
over the last three months on account of the weak 
economic activity and the steepening of the euro-
area yield curve. The steepness of the yield curve, 
reflecting the low ECB key interest rates, 
increased incentives to shift out of monetary 
assets. An overall lower degree of investors’ risk 
aversion might also have contributed to outflows 
from money holdings towards assets with longer 
maturities. Growth in the broad monetary 
aggregate, M3, was only 2.5 % in August, down 
from 3.6 % in June, thus continuing on its 
downward trend.  
Graph I.1.5: Monetary aggregates  
(in y-o-y % change, Jan 1999 to Aug 2009) 
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In contrast, the growth rate of the narrow 
monetary aggregate, M1, increased strongly, to 
13.6 % in August. In August 2008, M1 growth 
was as low as 0.3 %. M1 growth is often 
considered as one of the best forward-looking 
leading indicators for economic activity in the 
euro area, although this relationship might have 
been affected by the financial crisis. Indeed, the 
very low opportunity costs of holding short-term 
liquidity as well as investors’ preference to hold 
liquid assets for precautionary reasons have 
contributed to the extensive increase in the annual 
growth rate of M1. 
Graph I.1.6: M1 as a leading indicator for GDP 
(y-o-y % change — 1996Q1 to 2009Q2) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
The annual growth rate of loans to non-financial 
corporations dropped to 0.7 per cent in August, 
down from 2.8 per cent in the previous month, 
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along the downward trend that started in March 
2008. Loans growth to households contracted by 
0.2 per cent (y-o-y) in August, compared to 0.2 
per cent in June. According to the July ECB Bank 
Lending Survey, lower demand for credit due to 
the deteriorating economic outlook, economic 
uncertainty and the ongoing de-leveraging process 
in non-financial corporations have been the main 
explanatory factors behind the decline in loan 
growth, rather than supply-side restrictions. 
Nonetheless, access to finance remains subdued. 
In particular small and medium-sized enterprises 
as well as households report a deterioration in 
banks’ willingness to provide loans. They 
highlight above all the worsening of non-interest 
rate costs and conditions and more restrictive 
collateral requirements. 
Exchange rate developments 
The euro has seen large swings against its major 
trading partners’ currencies in recent quarters. 
Since mid-September 2008, foreign exchange 
markets have been largely driven by portfolio 
shifts as a result of changes in risk aversion. In 
nominal effective terms (NEER), the euro 
continued to appreciate by 7 % between 
November 2008 and March 2009, but stabilised 
somewhat thereafter. Over the last three months, 
the NEER has appreciated slightly. In real 
effective terms (REER), the euro is slightly 
stronger than a year ago. The euro CPI-deflated 
REER is currently almost 8 per cent above 
historical averages (1994-2008). ECFIN’s 
estimates of the euro equilibrium exchange rate 
also point to a strong euro.  
Graph I.1.7: Euro, dollar and yen exchange rates 
(2 Jan 2006 to 1 Oct 2009) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
Developments in the effective euro exchange rates 
mask different evolutions in bilateral exchange 
rates. The euro appreciated / depreciated against 
the US dollar (and the yen) whenever risk 
aversion decreased / increased. Appreciations of 
the dollar were largely driven by its safe-haven 
status and the high liquidity of dollar-
denominated securities. 
Since March 2009, the euro has steadily 
appreciated against the dollar as stock markets 
rose, exchange rate volatility declined and overall 
risk aversion receded. By 1 October 2009, the 
euro traded at 1.45 vis-à-vis the dollar, which 
compares to 1.41 in late June and around 1.25 in 
early March 2009.  
Graph I.1.8: Exchange rate volatility             
(1 Jun 2006 to 1 Oct 2009) 
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The yen appreciated vis-à-vis the euro following 
the intensification of the financial crisis in the 
autumn of 2008 when risk aversion in financial 
markets increased, leading to an unwinding of 
carry trades and Japanese investors repatriating 
funds. In March 2009, however, the yen started to 
depreciate against the euro as risk sentiment 
improved and carry trades were resumed. In late 
September 2009, the yen traded at 130 vis-à-vis 
the euro, only little changed compared to the end 
of June 2009. 
The pound sterling has depreciated around 8 % 
vis-à-vis the euro since June 2009 on more 
favourable indicators for economic activity in the 
euro area than in the UK and concerns that the 
pound's long-run value may have been 
fundamentally undermined by the financial crisis. 
Central European currencies have recently 
recovered part of the sharp depreciation that 
occurred between September 2008 and March 
2009. In particular, the Polish zloty appreciated by 
about 10 % against the euro in July while the 
Hungarian forint appreciated around 7 % during 
June and July. Since then, both currencies have 
been relatively stable. 
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The euro-area economy is starting to stabilise 
The euro-area economy contracted by 0.1 % q-o-q 
in the second quarter of 2009. This was the fifth 
consecutive quarterly decline, but it marked a 
substantial improvement on the previous quarter 
when the euro-area economy had suffered its 
worst rate of contraction (-2.5 %) since at least the 
1970s. This data confirms the view that an 
inflection point might have been reached during 
the first quarter.  
Graph I.1.9: Contribution to real GDP growth, 
euro area (q-o-q contributions in pp — 2007Q1 to 
2009Q2) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Among euro-area countries, growth was however 
fairly uneven. Germany and France posted an 
unexpected 0.3 % q-o-q growth while activity 
continued to contract, though more moderately 
than in the previous quarter, in Italy (-0.5 %), the 
Netherlands (-0.9 %) and Spain (-1.1 %). Most of 
the countries, except Italy and Spain, surprised 
positively compared to the projections in the 
Commission Spring Forecasts. With the exception 
of stock-building, all GDP components 
experienced some improvement compared to the 
first quarter. 
Stimulus measures and low inflation boosted 
consumption 
Household consumption grew by 0.2 % q-o-q in 
the second quarter of 2009, contributing 
significantly to the stabilisation. Growth was 
particularly strong in Germany (0.7 % q-o-q). This 
was due to a large extent to higher car purchases 
as a result of the scrappage premium. Household 
consumption in France (0.3 %) also benefited 
from the financial incentive introduced to scrap 
old cars.  
In addition, household consumption was boosted 
by very low inflation. Euro-area annual HICP 
headline inflation stood on average at 0.2 % y-o-y 
during the second quarter. It declined to -0.6 % y-
o-y in July and jumped back to -0.2 % in August; 
the third consecutive negative month. According 
to Eurostat's flash estimate, euro-area inflation is 
expected to be -0.3 % y-o-y in September. These 
negative readings are largely due to high negative 
base effects from the strong increase in oil prices 
last year. With these base effects turning positive 
and with oil prices picking up, headline inflation 
is expected to return to positive territory in the 
autumn but should remain low. Low inflation 
should maintain a stimulating effect on household 
consumption in the months ahead.  
 
Table I.1.1: Euro-area growth components 
GDP -0.3 -0.3 -1.8 -2.5 -0.1 -4.1
Private consumption -0.4 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 0.2 -0.8
Government consumption 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.4 1.9
Gross fixed capital formation -1.4 -1.4 -3.4 -5.3 -1.3 -9.6
Exports of goods and services -0.5 -0.9 -7.2 -8.8 -1.1 -15.0
Imports of goods and services -1.1 0.3 -4.7 -7.8 -2.8 -13.1
Private consumption -0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 -0.5
Government consumption 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4
Gross fixed capital formation -0.3 -0.3 -0.7 -1.1 -0.3 -2.1
Changes in inventories -0.2 0.4 0.3 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9
Net exports 0.3 -0.6 -1.2 -0.5 0.7 -1.1
2009 Q2
Percentage change on previous period, volumes
Percentage point contribution to change in GDP
2008 Q2 Carryover to 20092008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1
Source: Commission services. 
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Though holding up relatively well, household 
consumption has suffered from the deterioration 
of the labour market in the second quarter. 
Despite the various schemes to avoid a sharp drop 
in employment, employment contracted by 0.5 % 
q-o-q in the second quarter. This contraction was 
lower than the one recorded in the first quarter (-
0.7 %). But this easing mainly reflects the policy 
measures put in place to support employment. The 
latest data on unemployment is consistent with the 
contraction in employment. The euro-area 
unemployment rate ticked up to 9.3 % in the 
second quarter, compared to 8.8 % in the first 
quarter. The rise was widespread among 
countries, with Ireland and Spain experiencing the 
largest increases (+1.6pp and 1.4pp respectively).   
Looking ahead, the July and August data show 
further increases of euro-area unemployment to 
9.5 % and 9.6% respectively. At the same time, 
employment expectations derived from the 
Commission surveys improved in both 
manufacturing and services in July and August 
compared to the second quarter of 2009. 
However, surveys are still pointing to job 
reduction going forward. Given that the labour 
market tends to lag business cycle recoveries, it 
would therefore be premature to expect 
employment levels to increase any time soon. The 
evolution of the labour market could thus put a 
drag on the recovery. 
The increasing household saving rate could also 
delay the recovery. Due to high economic and 
financial uncertainty, the household saving ratio 
has been on a steep upward trend since 2008Q1. It 
has risen to 15.6 % in 2009Q1. Until now, 
consumption remained relatively resilient at a 
time when the saving ratio was on the rise. This 
was thanks to the disinflation process and 
relatively favourable developments in disposable 
income. However, the still high uncertainty of the 
recovery coupled with the poor employment 
prospects and the loss in wealth experienced by 
households could translate into an even higher 
saving rate in the next few quarters. With inflation 
picking up and disposable income falling, a higher 
propensity to save would inevitably lead to 
subdued consumption. 
Graph I.1.10: Household saving ratio, euro area 
(in % of real disposable income — 2000Q1 to 
2009Q1) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Car scrappage schemes in several euro-area 
countries may still boost consumption in the very 
short term. However, their withdrawal in the 
coming quarters coupled with a high level of 
uncertainty and deteriorating labour market 
conditions put the sustainability of the 
consumption recovery into question. In line with 
this, consumer confidence remains low by 
 
Table I.1.2: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2008-2009 
SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI Man.4) PMI Ser 5) IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8)
Long-term average 100.6 - 84.5 52.3 54.4 96.4 -10.6 22.4
September 2008 88.9 -0.5 97.4 45.0 48.4 92.5 -11.8 -41.1
October 2008 81.6 -1.0 96.0 41.1 45.8 90.0 -16.3 -63.0
November 2008 76.6 -1.6 94.8 35.6 42.5 85.8 -25.0 -53.5
December 2008 68.7 -2.5 93.9 33.9 42.1 82.7 -31.3 -45.2
January 2009 67.2 -2.6 93.5 34.4 42.2 83.1 -29.0 -31.0
February 2009 65.3 -3.1 93.6 33.5 39.2 82.6 -32.5 -5.8
March 2009 64.6 -3.3 94.1 33.9 40.9 82.2 -34.3 -3.5
April 2009 67.3 -3.1 95.1 36.8 43.8 83.8 -30.7 13.0
May 2009 70.2 -3.0 96.4 40.7 44.8 84.3 -29.8 31.1
June 2009 73.2 -2.9 97.9 42.6 44.7 86.0 -24.3 44.8
July 2009 76.0 -2.7 99.5 46.3 45.7 87.4 -21.9 39.5
August 2009 80.8 -2.2 - 48.2 49.9 90.5 -19.2 56.1
September 2009 82.8 -2.1 - 49.3 50.6* 91.3 -19.8 57.7
Sources: 1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator. 4) 
Bloomberg Purchasing Managers Index, manufacturing. 5) Bloomberg Purchasing Managers Index, services. 6) Business expectations, West 
Germany. 7) National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment, Germany. * Flash estimate. 
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historical standards, despite the continuous 
increase since April.  
Investment and trade stabilising but remaining 
weak 
Gross fixed capital formation declined by 1.3 % q-
o-q in the second quarter, a milder contraction 
than in the past two quarters (-3.4 % and -5.3 % in 
2008Q4 and 2009Q1 respectively). The 
breakdown of investment spending by sectors 
shows that the contraction in the second quarter 
was again the result of decreases in non-
construction investment (machinery and transport 
equipment essentially). Investment in the 
construction sector registered its smallest fall 
since 2008Q1, contracting by only 0.6 %, with 
non-housing investment showing its second 
consecutive increase (0.6 % q-o-q). Housing 
investment, while still declining (-1.9 % q-o-q), 
showed a lower rate of contraction than in the past 
four quarters, which could be read as a sign of 
possible bottoming-out on the housing market.   
Graph I.1.11: Assessment of stocks, euro area 
(balance normalised, Jan 2000-Sept 2009) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The weakness in business investment in the euro 
area is explained by weak demand and depressed 
profits. The capacity utilisation rate has fallen to 
record lows over the past few quarters. The July 
2009 reading of the quarterly manufacturing 
survey shows that capacity utilisation continued to 
decrease, although at a more moderate rate. In 
July, capacity utilisation was estimated at 69.5 %, 
the lowest level since the series began in 1990. 
The surveys also show that insufficient demand 
has increasingly been the main factor limiting 
production in the euro area during the past three 
quarters, followed by financial constraints, which 
gained in importance during the last three months. 
Inventories continued to make a significant 
negative contribution to growth in the second 
quarter. A heavy process of destocking took place 
in the first and second quarters of 2009, with 
firms adjusting production to the weak demand 
after the massive build-up at the end of 2008. 
Looking ahead, there are reasons to think that the 
pace of destocking may have slowed down in the 
third quarter. The latest Commission survey 
indicators indeed show a marked improvement in 
the level of stocks compared to the peak reached 
in December 2008 (Graph I.1.11). As a result, a 
positive contribution of inventories to GDP 
growth in the next quarters can be expected.  
Graph I.1.12: World trade and PMI              
(Jan 1998 to Aug 2009) 
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Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy 
Analysis and Bloomberg.  
The moderation of the decline in euro-area GDP 
growth in the second quarter can partly be 
attributed to the net exports performance. (2) 
Exports growth contraction eased significantly in 
the second quarter (-1.1 % q-o-q compared to        
-8.8 % in the first quarter), as did import growth  
(-2.8 % q-o-q compared to -7.8 %). This sign of 
stabilisation is backed up by encouraging 
developments in world trade. According to 
estimates by the Netherlands Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, world trade fell by only 0.7 % q-o-q in 
the second quarter, after contractions of 7.1 % in 
2008Q4 and 11.2 % in 2009Q1. Furthermore, in 
July, world trade rose by 3.5 % m-o-m, the 
strongest increase in a year. Recent data on 
industrial production and trade, notably from 
Asia, are also encouraging and some signs of 
further stabilisation are coming from the US as 
well. The Global PMI in the manufacturing sector 
has also improved markedly recently. In August, 
                                                        
(2) For a detailed analysis on trade, see Focus section ‘The slump 
in world trade and its impact on the euro area’. 
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having reached 53.1 points, it moved into 
expansion territory (i.e. above the neutral 50 
points). This was the highest reading in more than 
two years.  
Business surveys point to further improvement 
ahead  
The latest survey indicators point to encouraging 
short-term prospects for the euro area. The 
Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) rose further 
in September, registering the sixth consecutive 
increase since the trough in March. The 
improvement in September was, however, more 
moderate and the level remains below the long-
term average. The increase in the ESI in the third 
quarter compared to the second one was the result 
of a general increase in all sectors, except for the 
construction sector where confidence remained 
broadly stable compared to the second quarter. 
The improvement was also broad-based across 
euro-area countries. 
Graph I.1.13: Business and services confidence, 
euro area  
(balances in % — Jan 2000 to Sept 2009) 
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Source: Commission services. 
In the industry and services sectors, the pick-up in 
confidence was the result of an increase in 
expectations but also in the recent trends observed 
by firms. This is in contrast with the second 
quarter when only expectations were driving up 
confidence. It suggests that activity picked up 
some momentum in the third quarter. The PMIs 
for both manufacturing and services in the euro 
area send a similar message. They continued to 
increase during the third quarter. The PMI for 
services even breached the 50 mark in September, 
suggesting expansion in the sector, for the first 
time since May 2008. Manufacturing PMI, 
however, only rose to 49, showing another 
contraction in activity. Similar improvements 
have been visible in other national business 
sentiment indicators. While constantly rising since  
January, the IFO business expectations recorded a 
marked increase during the third quarter and so 
did the ZEW. The Belgian business confidence 
index (NBB) also improved further in July and 
August but experienced a small drop in 
September.  
Overall developments in confidence surveys 
suggest that the euro-area economy has entered a 
phase of stabilisation. In contrast, data on 
industrial production remains very weak. In July, 
industrial activity contracted further by 16.2 % y-
o-y compared to an average decline of 18.2 % in 
the second quarter.  
Short-term outlook and risks 
The Commission’s September 2009 interim 
forecasts project 0.2 % and 0.1 % q-o-q growth 
respectively for the third and fourth quarters of 
2009. The growth momentum for the second half 
of the year has thus been revised up compared to 
the Spring Forecast. For 2009 as a whole, 
however, the fall in GDP remains unchanged at    
-4 %. This is the result of downward revisions to 
the previous estimates for 2008 and the first 
quarter of 2009. The outlook for inflation also 
remains unchanged at 0.4 % for 2009.   
The risks to the growth outlook for 2009 appear 
broadly balanced. On the downside, further 
adverse feedback loops between a slowly 
recovering real sector and a still fragile financial 
sector cannot be ruled out. On the upside, policy 
interventions may be more effective than expected 
in sustaining demand, improving sentiment and 
restoring the soundness of the financial sector. 
The risks to the inflation outlook also appear 
largely balanced. Higher commodity prices and 
improving economic conditions suggest some 
upside risks, balanced by considerable slack in the 
economy which may hold down inflation more 
than expected. 
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2. Global current-account imbalances and 
implications for the euro area 
Over the last decade, significant global 
imbalances have built up. Some of the imbalances 
are currently unwinding, due in part to 
developments related to the ongoing economic 
and financial crisis. This section discusses the 
implications of this unwinding process for the 
euro area. It argues that although the euro area has 
not contributed to global imbalances, it could be 
severely affected by their unwinding depending 
on economic developments and policy decisions. 
Global imbalances increased until 2007 … 
Global current-account imbalances built up in the 
world economy starting in the late 1990s. On the 
back of massive capital inflows, the United States 
and some other countries such as the UK 
developed large and increasing current-account 
deficits. On the other hand, other key economies 
characterised by substantial trade surpluses and 
capital exports, notably China, Japan and the oil-
exporting countries, increased their surpluses (see 
Graph I.2.1). 
Graph I.2.1: Current-account balance  
(billion US$ - 2000-2009) 
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Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
… but are currently being reduced. 
The ongoing financial and economic crisis is 
accompanied by a considerable correction in the 
magnitude of global imbalances. This reflects the 
early and relatively sharp decline in domestic 
demand in the key deficit countries. High 
exposure to trade of some of the surplus countries 
and the plunge in oil prices has led to a substantial 
reduction of surpluses as well. Current-account 
deficits narrowed in the US and UK in 2008, and 
the current-account surplus narrowed in Japan. In  
 
China, during 2008 the crisis seems to have had a 
limited impact on the surplus. In most of the oil-
exporting countries, the surpluses widened in 
2008 because of the steep increase in oil prices in 
the first half of the year, but this hides a marked 
reduction in the surpluses in the second half of the 
year. 
Graph I.2.1 shows the European Commission 
latest available current-account forecasts for 
2009. (3) Current-account deficits in the US and 
the UK are expected to narrow further in 2009. 
Japan’s surplus is forecast to remain stable while 
China’s surplus is forecast to increase slightly. In 
most of the oil-exporting countries, the forecasts 
show the surpluses disappearing, driven by low 
oil prices. 
The first data for 2009 are broadly in line with 
these forecasts. The US current deficit narrowed 
further from 4.4 % of GDP in 2008Q4 to 2.9 % in 
2009Q1 and continued to narrow in 2009Q2 to 
2.8 %. In the UK, the current account remained 
broadly stable in 20091Q1. In Japan, the current-
account surplus remained stable in 2009Q1, after 
having shrunk considerably in the previous 
quarters. Regarding oil-exporting countries, trade 
data for the Gulf Cooperation Council countries 
suggest a further reduction of the surpluses in the 
first quarter of 2009, but the recent increase in oil 
prices may reverse this trend. Regarding China, 
current-account data for the first half of 2009 
showed a significant decrease in the surplus 
compared to the same period in the previous year. 
This is in line with developments in trade (see 
Box I.2.1) and suggests that the current-account 
surplus in 2009 could turn out to be weaker than 
the Commission Spring Forecast. (4) 
The euro area has switched from a broadly 
balanced current account to a moderate deficit. As 
Graph I.2.1 shows, the euro area had a very small 
surplus during 2002-2007 but in 2008 this turned 
into a deficit of around 70 billion euros. This 
indicates that, during the crisis, export demand 
has collapsed even more strongly than import 
demand. In relative terms, domestic demand has 
kept up well, driven by relatively resilient 
consumer spending. The euro area has thus 
provided a net demand stimulus to the world 
economy. Overall, the role of the euro area in 
global imbalances was negligible. However, the 
ongoing unwinding might have significant 
implications for the euro area.  
                                                        
(3) The forecast dates from the spring of 2009. 
(4) Data of the IMF spring forecast point in the same direction. 
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Graph I.2.2: Real effective exchange rates 
(1999=100, Jan 1999 to Aug 2009) (1) 
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(1) Real effective exchange rates against 41 major trading 
partners, based on the HICP. 
Source: Commission services. 
Prior to the current crisis, real effective exchange 
rates of many major economies, in particular the 
US, had been moving in the direction required to 
narrow current accounts. After the intensification 
of the crisis in the second half of 2008, there has 
clearly been a dramatic shift in this pattern. The 
US dollar’s real exchange rate appreciated due to 
flight-to-safety capital flows, reversing the longer-
run trend temporarily. In contrast, the Asian 
currencies moved in the right direction. More 
recently, these trends have partly reversed again. 
Overall, the picture is therefore rather 
heterogeneous and we conclude that exchange 
rates have not always adjusted the way they 
should adjust to reduce current-account 
imbalances.  
Part of the correction might prove lasting … 
Part of the recent correction in current-account 
imbalances may be sustained. In the US, the crisis 
appears to lead the private sector to increase 
savings rates to adjust to excessive leverage and a 
massive deterioration of balance sheets in the 
wake of falling asset prices. The US households 
saving rate has, since last year, partly reversed its 
20-year-decling trend, reaching 5% of after-tax 
income in the second quarter, the highest 
quarterly rate since 1998. At the same time 
 
 Box I.2.1: Recent Chinese trade data
China’s trade surplus appears to have declined in the first half of 2009. It narrowed by about 13% in value in the 
first seven months of 2009 compared to the first seven months of 2008. This change, however, hides much more 
significant movements in both exports and imports. Both export and import growth has fallen dramatically from 
positive values of around 20 to 30 % year-on-year to staggering negative numbers. The graph below shows annual 
growth rates for both exports and imports in value terms. The fall was particularly sharp at the peak of the crisis. 
More recently, the growth rates have stabilised at negative values of around -20%. Looking at the dynamic of 
imports relative to exports, in December and January, imports fell more significantly than exports. In contrast, in 
June and July, the pace of contraction slowed down more markedly for imports than for exports.  
The different dynamic of imports relative to exports 
could in part be related to the price of raw materials. 
Unfortunately, Chinese trade data are not available in 
volume terms. According to World Bank estimates, 
raw material import volumes have increased 
substantially since early this year.* Part of this 
increase may be due to increased stocking in times of 
low prices. Falling prices, however, have masked this 
increase so that values of imports have been falling. 
This suggests that the Chinese stimulus was effective 
in supporting import demand. However, the fall in 
prices more than offset the positive effects of the 
stimulus on import volumes in the first quarter. More 
recently, the values of trade imports have picked up 
with the prices of raw materials increasing again. 
Recently, the trade-balance deficit therefore narrowed 
and contributed to the reduction of the current-account 
deficit. 
* http://eapblog.worldbank.org/content/chinas-import-surge-standard-economic-theory-common-sense-prevails 
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housing investment has slowed markedly, further 
reducing borrowing. US households have seen the 
value of their assets shrink markedly due to the 
collapse in house and stock prices, while at the 
same time the value of their (mortgage) debt has 
remained. The savings rate is therefore expected 
to remain high for some years to allow households 
to repair their balance sheets. This has already led 
to a significant reduction in the US current-
account deficit. At the same time, the strong 
reduction in private demand has, so far and to 
some extent, been offset by unprecedented fiscal 
expansion. With a fiscal deficit of around 11 % of 
GDP for 2009, (5) public finance sustainability 
concerns become increasingly prevalent and the 
fiscal deficit is likely to be reduced substantially 
in the future. As a consequence, the US current-
account deficit could fall even further. 
… while cyclical elements of the correction 
could revert. 
However, some of the recent improvements could 
unwind when the global recovery takes hold. This 
is for two reasons.  
First, to some degree the recent correction has 
been the result of the sharp fall in the price of oil 
from its peak in 2008. If oil prices continue to rise 
as the world economic recovery takes stronger 
hold, then at least some of the imbalances will 
tend to widen again.  
Graph I.2.3: Trade balance in Gulf Cooperation 
Countries and oil prices  
(Jan 2006 to March 2009) 
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Graph I.2.3 shows the high degree of correlation 
between the trade balance in the Gulf Cooperation 
                                                        
(5) Projection taken from the Congressional Budget Office, 
August 2009. 
Countries and oil prices. The correlation suggests 
that trade surpluses in oil-producing countries are 
likely to increase again substantially with rising 
oil prices.  
Second, in the non-oil producing surplus 
countries, the decline in surpluses reflects the 
collapse in foreign demand for consumer durables 
and capital goods. A recovery in the deficit 
countries could lead to some bounce-back in 
spending on these items. Imbalances could 
therefore re-emerge unless surplus countries raise 
their domestic spending. Overall, however, a 
significant part of the reduced demand in deficit 
countries might turn out to be structural and last 
over the medium run. 
The remainder of the section explores what could 
be the implications for the euro area of a reduction 
in the US current account deficit. 
A permanent reduction in US demand will 
directly affect its main trading partners … 
The US produced 23.5 % of global GDP and 
absorbed 13 % of global exports in 2007. A 
reduction of US demand has therefore direct and 
quantitatively significant implications for its main 
trading partners. The magnitude of the impact 
depends inter alia on the intensity of the trade 
relationship and the size of the bilateral deficit or 
surplus.  
Graph I.2.4: The US trade deficit — Breakdown 
by trading partners (billion US$) 
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Graph I.2.4 shows the breakdown of the US trade 
deficit with its main trading partners. The single 
most important bilateral trade deficit is run with 
respect to China while the trade deficit with the 
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euro area is comparatively small. The trade deficit 
relative to China has been increasing strongly 
since 2001. A reduction in US demand will 
therefore lead to a significant shortfall in demand 
for Chinese but also Japanese and euro-area 
products. Suppose a permanent reduction in US 
demand went as far as to fully eliminate the US 
trade deficit of more than 800 billion US$ 
recorded in 2008. Then, the direct effect on the 
euro area could amount to around 90 billion US$ 
or a reduction of US absorption of euro-area 
products of around 0.7 % of euro-area GDP.  
… but indirect effects also matter. 
Beyond the direct effects, a reduction of US 
demand has significant indirect implications via 
relative price effects. In particular, it will put 
downward pressure on the US real exchange rate. 
The reduction of domestic absorption entails a 
relative excess supply of US-produced goods. (6) 
As a consequence, the supply of US goods will 
become relatively abundant on the world market. 
Such a relative excess supply will translate into a 
depreciation of the real exchange rate of the US.  
The implications of a reduction in US demand and 
a depreciation of the real US exchange rate for the 
euro area depend on policy actions and economic 
developments in other parts of the world. In order 
to gauge the potential impact of current-account 
adjustment on the euro area, it is useful to 
illustrate the mechanics with different scenarios. 
At least two basic scenarios can be distinguished. 
A benign scenario 
Let’s first assume a benign scenario and then turn 
to a less benign scenario. In a benign (or 
symmetric) scenario, surplus regions and in 
particular China are assumed to massively step up 
domestic absorption to compensate fully the 
decrease in the US trade deficit. Since there would 
be no world excess supply, world output would 
remain at its potential. To achieve such an 
outcome, surplus countries would have to take the 
necessary structural measures needed to boost 
domestic demand. Such structural change would 
have to be associated with an appreciation of the 
real effective exchange rate. The appreciation 
would have to combine an increase in the relative 
  
                                                        
(6) Since the US government as well as US households have a 
home-bias in consumption, the absorption of US goods will 
fall more strongly than the absorption of foreign-produced 
goods. 
price of non-tradable to tradable goods 
(appreciation of the internal exchange rate) and a 
nominal appreciation relative to the dollar. The 
internal appreciation is needed to re-direct 
consumption to the tradable sector and re-allocate 
production to the non-tradable sector. The 
nominal appreciation relative to the US$ would 
help to increase the share of US goods in imports, 
in particular in China. (7) The price changes 
would likely have to be accompanied by 
substantial structural measures, for example, in 
China, health care or social security could lower 
the savings rate. Also other surplus regions such 
as Japan and the oil-producing exporters would 
step in and increase domestic absorption. 
Graph I.2.5: The euro-area trade balance  
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Source: Eurostat. 
In this scenario, the euro-area trade balance level 
would remain largely unchanged. There would, 
however, be a change in its composition. As 
Graph I.2.5 shows, the euro area is running trade 
surpluses with respect to the US and the UK, 
while recently the deficit relative to China has 
massively increased. Strong Chinese expansion 
would likely reduce the trade deficit with China. 
At the same time, the trade surplus with respect to 
the US could fall due to exchange rate 
appreciation relative to the US. Also the euro-area 
trade deficit relative to Japan could fall. 
                                                        
(7) The mechanics of the internal and the total real exchange rate 
are discussed in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2007), ‘The 
unsustainable US current account position revisited’, in R. 
Clarida (ed.), G7 current account imbalances: sustainability 
and adjustment, University of Chicago Press. Empirical 
evidence for the relevance of the internal exchange rate has 
recently been provided by Ruscher and Wolff (2009), 
‘External rebalancing is not just an exporters’ story: real 
exchange rates, the non-tradable sector and the euro’, 
European Economy, Economic Papers 375. 
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An asymmetric scenario … 
It is, however, possible that the euro area will 
have to shoulder a more significant share of the 
burden of the adjustment for several reasons.  
First, China could resist increasing absorption of 
US products and appreciation with respect to the 
US$. This policy would aim to keep its trade 
surplus relative to the US and avoid negative 
wealth effects on assets denominated in US 
dollars held by Chinese authorities due to price 
effects. As a consequence, US exporters would be 
required to lower prices even more strongly with 
respect to other trade partners to find a market to 
sell their products. This could lead to a euro-area 
trade deficit relative to the US and stronger 
appreciation of the euro real exchange rate to the 
dollar.  
Second, China could allow an appreciation of the 
renminbi with respect to the US$ but be unable to 
increase its domestic absorption to the extent 
needed. This would increase Chinese imports of 
US goods and reduce Chinese exports to the US 
but would force Chinese companies to raise 
exports to other markets, in particular to the euro 
area. To achieve this, prices of Chinese products 
would have to be lowered and the euro-area trade 
balance with China would move further into the 
red. Moreover, the euro would appreciate in real 
terms relative to China. 
In both cases, a substantial euro-area trade deficit 
would emerge. The euro-area tradable sector 
would come under significant price pressures as 
foreign-produced goods would become cheaper. 
Euro-area consumers would increasingly 
substitute domestic with foreign-produced 
tradable goods. 
... would be less benign for the euro area. 
A situation where a substantial trade deficit 
emerges in the euro area appears less beneficial to 
the euro area than the benign scenario, in which 
surplus countries and in particular China would 
massively step up domestic absorption. Two 
reasons can be given. 
First, the associated real appreciation of the euro 
would ultimately pressure euro-area companies to 
reduce the production of export goods. Depending 
on the flexibility of the euro-area economy, time 
would be needed to re-allocate resources from the 
tradable to the non-tradable sector. In the 
transition phase, the euro-area output gap would 
be affected negatively and unemployment could 
rise, in particular in the tradable sector and, 
particularly so, in Member States more heavily 
reliant on exports. Limited labour mobility in the 
euro area would further slow adjustment and 
aggravate the negative effects.  
Second, large current-account deficits are 
probably not desirable in Europe’s ageing 
societies. Countries facing an ageing problem 
should typically run current-account surpluses in 
order to accumulate foreign assets for the times 
when more people retire. (8) 
Likelihood of scenarios depends on policy 
choices. 
Overall, the jury is still out on which scenario will 
materialize as this will depend on policy choices. 
Implementing the benign scenario involves a 
number of policy challenges to global partners. In 
particular, appropriate policies would need to be 
put in place to successfully boost domestic 
absorption in key surplus countries, in particular 
China. A reduction of the US current-account 
deficit by 3 pp of US GDP would amount to an 
excess of world supply of around 430 billion US$. 
Given the size of the Chinese economy at around 
4 400 billion US$, Chinese absorption would need 
to increase by around 10 % of Chinese GDP, 
essentially eliminating the Chinese current-
account surplus. From a policy point of view, this 
would require a substantial decrease in the 
(private sector) corporate and household savings 
rate. While China has increased the credit supply 
to its economy in the first half of the year and also 
stepped up efforts to introduce health care 
insurance, (9) these measures might not be enough 
to increase Chinese absorption by that magnitude, 
in the next couple of years. More recently, 
Chinese credit expansion has slowed again, 
possibly because of fears of the emergence of 
bubbles in equity markets. This suggests that 
investment demand could slow again. There is 
also concern that heavy capital investment might 
ultimately increase excess capacities of tradable 
goods and thereby aggravate the surplus. In 
addition, Chinese authorities themselves recognise 
the difficulty in raising consumption in the short 
to medium term. (10) A further policy angle 
                                                        
(8) However, China too will face growing ageing pressures in the 
next decades. These, however, can be offset to some extent 
by higher growth rates. 
(9) See e.g. Geoff Dyer, ‘Sickness of the savers’, Financial 
Times, FT.com, 12 May 2009. 
(10) See address by Governor Zhou Xiaochuan of the People’s 
Bank of China at the global think-tank summit in Beijing on 
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consists of financial development policies, which 
would be instrumental in facilitating access to 
credit for relatively small private companies, 
helping to reduce corporate saving rates.  
Among the other surplus countries, Japan faces 
significant policy constraints to create substantial 
extra demand. The oil-producing economies will, 
in general, see their surplus increase with rising 
oil prices and are unlikely to generate sufficient 
domestic demand to offset rising exports. On a 
more positive note, Brazil and India are both 
forecast to increase their trade deficits (or reduce 
their surplus) with the rest of the world. However, 
in absolute terms, the figures are comparatively 
small. 
Last but not least, Chinese as well as US 
authorities might take into account implications in 
international capital markets of adjusting their 
exchange-rate policies. Such an adjustment 
would, on the one hand, affect the value of 
existing US dollar-denominated assets held by 
Chinese authorities. On the other hand, it might 
also affect the financing conditions of the US 
government. 
Graph I.2.6: China’s GDP growth rate and 
current account to GDP ratio (in %) 
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook. 
Consistent with these arguments, the IMF forecast 
suggests that Chinese surpluses will continue to 
increase and a global excess supply could emerge 
given a no-change exchange rate scenario. 
Graph I.2.6 shows that the Chinese current 
account to GDP ratio is forecast to reach levels 
similar to the time prior to the crisis. Since GDP is 
                                                                                  
3 July 2009. In his speech, the Governor raised the prospects 
of redirecting excess capacity to developing countries 
through China’s ‘Going Global’ strategy. Such a redirection, 
however, is likely to be successful only in the medium to 
long run. 
also forecast to grow strongly, the current-account 
surplus will strongly increase in absolute terms.  
Thus, at this stage significant policy challenges 
exist to reduce the implications of an unwinding 
of global imbalances in deficit countries (in 
particular the US) for the euro area. Rising oil 
prices could put further pressure on the US 
consumers’ budget constraint. Given the relatively 
inelastic demand for oil in the short to medium 
run, US households would have to further cut 
non-oil consumption to pay for the increasing 
energy bill. This, in turn, would further reduce 
demand for typical euro-area exports. 
Conclusions 
The above analysis suggests that attention should 
be paid to the process of how global current-
account imbalances unwind. Its potential 
implications for the euro-area economy are 
significant, even though the euro area had a 
balanced current account prior to the crisis. Thus, 
while the euro area as a whole has not contributed 
to global imbalances, the resolution of these 
imbalances could affect it significantly. From a 
policy perspective, the euro area as a whole would 
benefit from an increase in domestic absorption 
across surplus countries, in particular China, and 
from an appreciation of the Chinese currency 
relative to the US dollar. 
If the scenario of an asymmetric unwinding of 
imbalances eventually prevails, the euro area will 
have to prepare itself by fostering policies that 
facilitate resource reallocation from the tradable 
to the non-tradable sector. Services sector reform 
should therefore remain high on the agenda. 
Increasing price pressure on tradable goods would 
affect in particular those Member States that rely 
heavily on exports for growth. Policies increasing 
labour mobility across countries and sectors could 
be beneficial in this context. Such policies would 
also be instrumental in facilitating the adjustment 
to imbalances existing within the euro area.  
The G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh agreed to launch a 
new framework for strong, sustainable and 
balanced growth.(11) This will be a cooperative 
process of mutual assessment of the G-20 
members' policies in order to evaluate whether 
national policies are collectively consistent with 
more sustainable and balanced global growth. 
                                                        
(11) The final G20 communiqué can be found at 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_s
tatement_250909.pdf 
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Coordination among major economies is 
necessary to make sure that the recovery does not 
lead to the re-emergence of global imbalances and 
asset price bubbles. In this framework, the IMF 
will provide the basic surveillance, looking at the 
global consistency of policies while the G-20 will  
contribute to increase the policy traction of the 
IMF advice. The new framework will be launched 
by G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors at their meeting in St. Andrews on 7-8 
November while leaders will review the results at 
the next Summit in Canada in June 2010. 
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3. The interrelations between household 
savings, wealth and mortgage debt 
This section sheds some light on balance sheet 
adjustment in the household sector and possible 
consequences for the recovery in the euro area. 
Rapid accumulation of mortgage debt in some 
Member States over the past decade (Graph I.3.1) 
and recent sharp falls in equity and house prices 
may have altered household balance sheets, 
forcing a balance-sheet consolidation that may 
weigh on the recovery of private consumption. 
Despite their recent rally, equity prices are still 
about 50 % lower than at the beginning of 2008. 
House prices have also come down, although 
more moderately, by 1.5 % in real terms over the 
past year (Graph I.3.2). 
Graph I.3.1: Change in household debt to GDP 
ratio, euro area (in pp, 1998-2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Changes in asset prices may have important 
implications for households’ savings via the 
traditional wealth effects, personal spending being 
directly affected by changes in net wealth. But 
they also alter the composition of household 
balance sheets and may affect savings decisions of 
credit-constrained households (i.e. households to 
whom banks lend less than the total value of their 
assets). For instance, a rise in house prices may 
boost the consumption of house owners, who see 
their wealth and the value of their collateral 
increase accordingly. However, it may also force 
credit-constrained households to save more in 
order to acquire a house as it raises the value of 
the share of the acquisition that will not be 
covered by the mortgage. Against this 
background, the possible interactions between 
asset prices, mortgage decisions and consumption 
are best analysed in a single framework. 
Graph I.3.2: House and equity prices, euro area 
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(1) Data for house prices is annual (1987-2008), while the data 
for equity prices is quarterly (1987Q1-2009Q1). 
Source: Commission services. 
According to the permanent income theory, 
savings decisions should depend on households’ 
permanent disposable income and their net 
wealth. However, housing wealth effects are 
notoriously difficult to identify empirically in the 
euro area, with housing wealth variables generally 
coming out as statistically insignificant in 
consumption equations. Therefore, in order to 
disentangle the housing wealth effects in the euro 
area, an important role is given in this analysis to 
the interaction between net wealth and mortgage 
indebtedness.  
The medium-term interrelations between 
households’ savings and mortgage decisions 
The interrelations between households’ mortgage 
debt and savings are estimated econometrically in 
a common co-integrating framework which relates 
savings and mortgages to their respective 
fundamental determinants in a system of two 
medium-term equations (Table I.3.1).  
Estimation results show that, in the medium term, 
the savings ratio is determined by the financial 
wealth and housing wealth ratios, the ratio of 
mortgage to housing wealth, the long-term real 
interest rate and inflation (Table I.3.1, Col.1). 
Financial wealth effects are present in the euro 
area, with a 10 % increase in financial wealth 
boosting consumption by about 0.9 %. The 
estimated elasticity of financial wealth is in the 
range of the estimates generally reported for the 
euro area in the available empirical literature. (12) 
                                                        
(12) See for instance: Sousa, M. Ricardo (2009), ‘Wealth effects 
on consumption. Evidence from the euro area’, ECB 
Working Paper Series No 1050; Skudelny, F. (2009), ‘Euro 
I. Economic situation in the euro area 
 
- 23 -
It corresponds to a marginal propensity to 
consume of about 3 cents to the euro (i.e. an 
increase in financial wealth of one euro is 
associated with an increase in consumption of      
3 cents). This remains on the low side compared 
with similar estimates reported for the US. Rising 
financial wealth has nevertheless played an 
important role in the fall of the savings ratio in the 
euro area since the late 1980s. The strong rise in 
financial wealth in the 1990s was accompanied by 
a simultaneous sharp drop in household savings, 
while the broad stagnation of financial wealth 
since the early 2000s reflects a similar 
development in the savings ratio as evidenced by 
the close historical correlation between the two 
variables (Graph I.3.3). 
 
Table I.3.1: Estimated medium-term 
relationships (1980Q1-2008Q3) 
Variables
Col. 1 Col. 2
Savings/Yd 1 -
Mortgage/Yd - 1
Net financial wealth/Yd 0.56 -
Mortgage/Net housing wealth (1) 0.43
Net housing wealth/Yd 0.24 -0.71
Short-term real interest rate - 3.46
Long-term real interest rate 5.66 8.89
Inflation 3.34 6.86
Medium-term elasticities
Yd = household gross disposable income. All estimated 
coefficients are significant at 1 %. (1) This is not a variable used 
in the actual estimation; it just illustrates the interpretation of the 
estimated coefficients on the mortgage and net housing wealth 
ratios in the savings equation. See Box I.3.1 for a more detailed 
discussion. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Estimation results also show that, in the medium 
term, mortgage demand is determined by the level 
of interest rates (short and long), inflation and 
housing wealth (Table I.3.1, Col.2). Long rates 
play a somewhat bigger role than short rates, a 
finding which is in line with the structure of most 
Member States’ mortgage markets, where fixed-
interest-rate contracts tend to dominate. Higher 
inflation comes with lower mortgage demand, 
indicating the existence of some front-loading 
effect. (13) Higher net housing wealth (i.e. housing 
wealth minus mortgage) is associated with higher 
mortgage, pointing to the existence of collateral 
effects. 
                                                                                  
area private consumption. Is there a role for housing wealth 
effects?’ ECB Working Paper Series No 1057. 
(13) With fixed mortgage instalments, inflation is associated with 
a progressive erosion of the real burden of debt over time. 
This partial transfer of the real burden of debt to the early 
stages of a mortgage’s lifetime is higher when inflation is 
higher. 
Graph I.3.3: Savings ratio and net financial 
wealth ratio, euro area (1980Q1-2008Q3) (1) 
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(1) Inverted scale on the right hand side. Savings and net 
financial wealth are expressed as a share of gross disposable 
income. 
Source: Commission services and ECB. 
An interesting and novel finding of the estimated 
model is that it points to interactions between 
housing wealth, mortgage and consumption that 
are more complex than generally reported in the 
empirical literature on the euro area. Indeed, the 
estimated medium-term equation for savings 
(Table I.3.1, Col.1) suggests that housing affects 
consumption via two offsetting channels: a rise in 
house prices tends to push consumption up via the 
traditional housing wealth effect but it also tends 
to depress consumption via a credit constraint 
channel. The second effect translates the fact that, 
when house prices increase, credit-constrained 
households need to save more to pay for the share 
of their acquisition that is not covered by the 
mortgage. In the regression, this is implicitly 
captured by a negative relationship between the 
savings ratio and the ratio of mortgages to 
housing wealth. (14) The estimated coefficients on 
the mortgage and net housing wealth ratios are 
interpreted as a small but significant housing 
wealth effect combined with a credit-constraint 
effect captured by the ratio of mortgage to 
housing wealth (Table I.3.1, Col.1).    
The identified credit constraint channel appears to 
be quite sizeable in the euro area. (15) As 
evidenced by a large increase in the mortgage to 
                                                        
(14) This ratio can be considered as being correlated with past 
average loan-to-value ratios and, therefore, capturing the 
extent to which the credit-constrained households need to 
save in order to pay for the share of the acquired property 
value not covered by the mortgage. 
(15) In the literature, other forms of credit constraints have also 
been identified. In general, they refer to the collateral effects 
of house price changes (e.g. the increase in value of the 
collateral, following a rise in house prices, would ease the 
credit constraints). 
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housing wealth ratio, credit constraints have 
probably eased significantly over the past two 
decades (Graph I.3.4). Given the large size of the 
estimated elasticity of savings with respect to the 
mortgage to housing wealth ratio, the easing of 
credit constraints has contributed as much as the 
increase in financial wealth to the fall in the 
savings ratio in the euro area in the 1990s. 
Graph I.3.4: Ratios of mortgage to net housing 
wealth and of savings to gross disposable income 
(1980Q1-2008Q3) 
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Source: Commission services. 
In contrast, the more traditional housing wealth 
channel appears small in the euro area. The 
estimated coefficient corresponds to a marginal 
propensity to consume out of housing wealth of 
only 1 cent in the euro, which is considerably 
lower than estimates usually reported for the US 
economy. 
Graph I.3.5: Net housing wealth, net financial 
wealth and mortgages, euro area  
(in % of gross disposable income, 1980Q1-2008Q3) 
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Source: Commission services and ECB. 
As a result of the large size of the credit constraint 
channel and the small size of the housing wealth 
channel, the medium-term net effect of a rise in 
  
house prices on savings (consumption) is positive 
(negative) in the euro area. This stands in sharp 
contrast with data for the US, where house prices 
and the savings ratio are negatively correlated. (16) 
The interaction between credit constraints and 
house prices sheds some light on the root causes 
of the sluggish developments of consumption in 
the euro area in the present decade. Contrary to 
the US, the significant increase in net housing 
wealth in the period 2000-2007 (Graph I.3.5) did 
not fuel a consumption boom. This can be 
explained by the small size of housing wealth 
effects in the euro area but also — and above all 
— by credit constraints. Over 2000-2007, the ratio 
of mortgages to net housing wealth did not 
increase significantly (Graph I.3.4) as the rapid 
rise in house prices largely offset the relaxation of 
loan-to-value constraints by banks. This, in turn, 
led to a near stagnation of the savings ratio. In 
contrast, slower rises in house prices in the second 
half of the 1990s allowed a surge in the ratio of 
mortgage to housing wealth over that period and, 
thereby, a significant fall in the savings ratio.  
Complex short-term interactions between 
mortgage, savings and house prices 
Deviations of savings and mortgage from their 
fundamental determinants trigger short-term 
correction forces (see Box I.3.1, right part of the 
table). Two features of this short-term correction 
mechanism are worth stressing: First, when 
mortgage demand overshoots the level dictated by 
its fundamental determinants, correction takes 
place via an increase in savings. The result is 
fairly intuitive: if the mortgage level turns out to 
be too high relative to fundamentals (for instance 
because households have embarked on an episode 
of irrational exuberance regarding their future 
income prospects), the cash needed to scale back 
debt is obtained by raising savings. A 1 % 
increase in the deviation of the mortgage ratio 
from its medium-term value would cause a short-
run rise in the savings ratio of 0.11 % (see 
Box I.3.1, right-hand part of the table, Col I). 
Second, an increase in house prices can have a 
relatively strong positive effect on consumption in 
the short term due to the existence of temporary 
confidence effects (see Box I.3.1, right part of the 
table, Col. I). However, the associated increase in 
consumption tips the medium-term savings  
 
                                                        
(16) Which is in line with conventional wisdom according to 
which credit constraints are higher in the euro area than the 
US. 
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 Box I.3.1: Household savings and net housing wealth
Savings and mortgage debt (as ratios of gross disposable income) have been related to their respective medium-term 
determinants in a system of two co-integrating relations estimated in a VEC model with 7 variables. The analysis 
has been carried out for the period 1980Q1-2008Q3 for the euro area. All variables are in logarithms except the two 
interest rates and inflation. The latter are just scaled by 100. Net housing wealth is defined as housing wealth minus 
mortgage loans. Net financial wealth is defined as financial wealth plus mortgage loans. The results are presented in 
the table below. 
The medium-term savings equation (left-hand part of the table, I). Net financial wealth, as a percentage of gross 
disposable income, comes out as the main determinant of the savings ratio in the medium term in the euro area. A 
1% increase in net financial wealth as a share of gross disposable income will lead to a decrease of about 0.6% in 
the savings ratio, boosting consumption by about 0.09%. This is equivalent to a marginal propensity to consume out 
of the net financial wealth of 0.03. The mortgage ratio and the net housing wealth ratio have a combined effect on 
savings: a small but significant housing wealth effect combined with a credit-constraint effect implicitly captured by 
the ratio of mortgages to net housing wealth. The latter ratio can be considered as being correlated with past average 
loan-to-value ratios and, therefore, capturing the extent to which credit-constrained households needed to save in 
order to pay for the share of the acquired property value not covered by the mortgage. Therefore, the estimated 
coefficients are interpreted as follows: (1) a 1% increase in the ratio of mortgage to net housing wealth will decrease 
the savings ratio by 0.43%; (2) a 1% increase in the net housing wealth leads to a 0.24% decrease in the savings 
ratio (i.e. 0.43*log(Mortgages/Yd) - 0.19*log(Net housing wealth/Yd) = 0.43*log(Mortgages/Net housing wealth) 
+0.24*log(Net housing wealth/Yd). This shows small wealth effects from an increase in housing wealth at the level 
of the euro area, equivalent to a marginal propensity to consume out of the net housing wealth of 0.01.  
The medium-term mortgage equation (left-hand part of the table, II). The medium-term determinants of mortgages 
as a percentage of gross disposable income have been found to be the net housing wealth as a percentage of gross 
disposable income, the short-term real interest rate, the long-term real interest rate and inflation. In the medium-
term, a 1% increase in net housing wealth increases mortgages by 0.71%, showing the extent of the collateral effect 
of net housing wealth on mortgages. An increase in interest rates and inflation decreases the mortgage ratio as 
expected. A 1pp increases in the short-term real interest rate and the long-term real interest rate decreases the 
mortgage ratio by about 4% and about 9% respectively. This shows that long-term interest rates are playing a bigger 
role in the euro area in accordance with the euro-area mortgage markets, where fixed-interest-rate contracts 
dominate. A 1pp increase in inflation decreases the mortgage ratio by about 7%. 
The estimated short-run elasticities are presented in the right-hand part of the table. The short-term dynamics link 
changes in savings and mortgage ratios to the lagged deviations of savings and mortgage ratios from their medium-
term determinants (the error-correction terms) and the lagged changes of all the other variables in the system. 
Changes in net financial wealth, net housing wealth and inflation are also included contemporaneously as these 
variables are found not to adjust to the deviations from the medium-term equilibrium (i.e. the null hypothesis of zero 
short-run adjustment coefficients for the growth in net real financial wealth ratio, net real housing wealth ratio and 
inflation cannot be rejected). This is called ‘no levels feedback’ or long-run weak exogeneity. 
The results show that that a 1% increase in the deviation of the mortgage ratio from its medium-term value 
(determined by the net housing wealth ratio, the real interest rates, and inflation), would cause an increase in the 
short run of the savings ratio by 0.11%. This effect on consumption was found to be asymmetric. The correction due 
to overshooting was much higher than the correction during the undershooting (i.e. 0.15% as compared to 0.09%). 
By comparing the actual mortgage ratio to that predicted by the co-integrating equation for mortgages, there seems 
to have been an overshooting in the mortgage ratio over the period 2006Q4 to 2008Q3. Debt overshooting due to an 
increase in mortgages also triggers the savings ratio to overshoot, pulling the savings ratio down through the 
offsetting effect from the first error-correction term (i.e. a 1% increase in the deviation of the savings ratio from its 
medium-term value decreases the savings ratio growth by 0.28%). However, this latter effect is smaller than the debt 
overshooting effect. 
The short-run dynamics also indicate that a 1% increase in housing wealth growth decreases contemporaneously the 
savings ratio by about 0.7%, decrease that is offset in the following quarters through the error correction term and 
the lagged change in net housing wealth. This gives the traditional confidence effect on wealth captured by the 
contemporaneous change in net housing wealth ratio to disposable income and, respectively, the lagged effect on the 
credit-constrained households captured by the lagged change in the mortgages to net housing wealth ratio — the  
(Continued on the next page)
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equation out of balance and equilibrium is 
progressively restored by raising savings. After 4-
6 quarters, consumption falls below the level 
prevailing before the rise in house prices (see 
Box I.3.1 for a detailed discussion). 
What are the risks for consumer spending in 
the recovery? 
Unlike its two predecessors of the early 1990s and 
early 2000s, the current recession is characterised 
by a simultaneous slump in housing and equity 
markets. The model presented in this section 
suggests that consumer spending will be subject to 
conflicting forces in the quarters to come.  
On the negative side, past falls in house and, 
especially, equity prices are weighing 
significantly on consumption via the traditional 
wealth effect. Furthermore, euro-area consumers 
entered the recession with a debt overhang that 
has exerted a significant drag on consumption 
growth over the past two years and should 
continue to rein in spending for about one more 
year. (17) The model suggests that the ratio of 
mortgage to disposable income has overshot its 
fundamental level since 2006Q4 with a peak of 
15 % in 2007Q4. Recently, the extent of the 
                                                        
(17) In 2007-08, the correction in the debt overhang caused an 
average decrease of about 0.4 pp in the annual growth of 
consumption and the overshooting was in 2008Q3 still half 
way from its peak. 
Box (continued) 
 
decrease in this ratio has a positive effect on savings. This latter effect dominates the confidence effect in the euro 
area, the overall response becoming positive after 3 quarters. 
Positive changes in net financial wealth decrease the savings ratio growth, effects that are reinforced over the next 
quarters. A 1% increase in financial wealth growth decreases the savings ratio in the short run by 0.17%, suggesting 
that positive developments on the stock market have confidence effects. 
Co-integrating equations (1):  
(19980Q1-2008Q3) 
Short-run elasticities (1): 
(19980Q1-2008Q3) 
 I II  I II 
Variable (2) 
Elasticities  
– savings 
equation 
Elasticities  
– mortgage 
equation 
Variable (2) Change in Savings/Yd 
Change in 
Mortgages/Yd 
Savings/Yd 1.00 - Error-correction term I (savings equation) -0.28***    -0.05** 
Mortgages/Yd 0.43 1.00 Error-correction term II (mortgage equation) 
0.11*** 
Overshooting 
0.15*** 
Undershooting 
0.09*** 
-0.005 
Overshooting 
0.003 
Undershooting  
-0.009 
Net financial 
wealth/Yd 0.56 - 
Change in Savings/Yd  
(lagged 1 quarter) -0.04 -0.005 
Net housing 
wealth/Yd  -0.19 -0.71 
Change in Mortgages/Yd  
(lagged 1 quarter) -0.41** 0.16** 
Short-term real 
interest rate - 3.46 
Change in Net financial 
wealth/Yd  -0.17** 0.06* 
Long-term real 
interest rate 5.66 8.89 
Change in Net financial 
wealth/Yd (lagged 1 quarter) -0.09 0.05 
Inflation 3.34 6.86 Change in Net housing wealth/Yd (3) -0.70*** 0.54*** 
Constant -6.51 -0.12 Change in Net housing wealth/Yd (lagged 1 quarter) 0.88*** -0.44*** 
   Change in inflation  0.05 -0.46** 
 Change in inflation (lagged by 1quarter) -0.21 -0.15 
(1) The variables are all non-stationary. The Johansen 
approach was used to test for the number of co-integrating 
relations and to estimate the equations. Over-identifying 
restrictions were tested, LR test for binding restrictions 
(rank=2), chi-square (7) =5.42, probability 0.60. 
(2) All estimated coefficients are significant at 1%. Yd = 
household gross disp. income. 
Source: Commission services and ECB data. 
(1) The VAR in first differences is a partial system (i.e. conditioned 
on the current changes in the weakly  exogenous variables) that has 
1 lag and includes a constant, the error correction terms, the lagged 
changes in all variables, and the contemporaneous changes in net 
financial wealth, net housing wealth and inflation. 
(2) ***, ** and * denote respectively statistical significance at 1, 5 
and 10%. 
(3) This coefficient could be slightly over-estimated due to some 
remaining endogeneity of the change in the net housing wealth in the 
system. 
Source: Commission services and ECB data. 
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overhang has been aggravated by the negative 
effect of the fall in house prices on the medium-
term debt level.  
On the positive side, a permanent decrease in 
house prices could provide some support to 
consumption in the medium term as households 
have to save less for housing acquisition. The 
ongoing fall in house prices will not be reverted 
rapidly, and a return of the surge in house prices 
observed in the 2000s is unlikely in the years to 
come.  
While negative effects linked to equity prices and 
the debt overhang are currently dominating, the 
dynamics of consumer spending over the two 
years to come will obviously depend on the 
dynamics and sizes of the asset price shocks, in 
particular the extent to which they prove 
permanent. Two features of the model are worth 
mentioning in this context. First, a shock to house 
prices must be about four times larger than the 
shock to equity prices for the positive effect of a 
fall in house prices to prevail in the medium term, 
or the shock to equity prices must be temporary. 
Although equity prices have rallied in recent 
months, a full rebound in equity prices has clearly 
not been the case so far. Second, the estimated 
lags in the model are relatively short. Falls in 
asset prices and debt adjustment are likely to 
weigh substantially on consumption growth in 
2009 but should wear off progressively in 2010 
provided that asset prices stabilise end of 2009 or 
beginning of 2010. 
Nevertheless, the analysis also points to serious 
downside risks to the consumption recovery 
related to credit constraints. The savings ratio will 
depend on future developments in the loan-to-
value (LTV) ratios practised by banks. If the 
financial crisis induces banks to adopt more 
restrictive practices in terms of loan-to-value 
ratios (18) and, as a result, the drop in mortgages 
proves to be faster than the drop in house prices, 
the savings ratio will have to increase. The 
potential magnitude of this effect is difficult to 
assess. (19) However, the large contribution of the 
changes in the mortgage to housing wealth ratio to 
the drop in the savings ratio in the euro area in the 
1990s suggests that the effect could be large and 
persistent.  
                                                        
(18) If LTV ratios are above a certain level, mortgage loans 
receive a higher risk weight, requiring banks to hold more 
(costly) capital against those loans. 
(19) Due to lack of adequate data, structural changes in LTVs are 
not modelled explicitly and are only captured indirectly via 
their effects on the ratio of mortgages to net housing wealth. 
Conclusions 
The interaction between net wealth and 
indebtedness seems to play an important role in 
the euro area. While net financial wealth, as a 
percentage of gross disposable income, comes out 
as the main determinant of the savings ratio in the 
medium term in the euro area, the relationship 
between housing wealth and consumption is 
complex. A rise in house prices tends to push 
consumption up via the traditional housing wealth 
effect, but it also tends to depress consumption 
because of credit constraints. The second effect 
reflects the fact that, when house prices increase, 
credit-constrained households need to save more 
to pay for the share of their acquisition that is not 
covered by the mortgage.  
Past trends in savings in the euro area can largely 
be explained by financial wealth effects and the 
interaction between credit constraints and house 
prices. In contrast, traditional housing wealth 
effects remain limited. The drop in the savings 
ratio in the 1980s and 1990s can be traced back to 
large gains in financial wealth 
and an easing of credit constraints (mostly in the 
latter decade). Its broad stabilisation since the turn 
of the century reflects a similar development in 
financial wealth and the fact that a further easing 
in banks’ credit practices (e.g. in terms of loan-to-
value ratios) has been largely offset by surging 
house prices, leading to only limited further gains 
in households’ effective credit constraints.  
There is evidence that the ratio of mortgage to 
disposable income had overshot the level dictated 
by its fundamental determinants since 2006Q4. 
The correction of this debt overhang and past 
sharp falls in equity prices are currently taking 
their toll on consumption in the euro area. In the 
absence of further falls in asset prices, these 
negative effects should, however, wear off 
progressively in 2010 and give way to a recovery 
of consumption. Nevertheless, the analysis also 
points to a serious risk to the consumption 
recovery which relates to a possible increase in 
credit constraints in the wake of the crisis (i.e. a 
reduction of loan-to-value ratios). 
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1. The slump in world trade 
Recent developments and projections 
Between 2001 and 2008, world trade grew 
strongly at an average yearly rate of 6½ % in real 
terms. Since April 2008, however, world trade has 
fallen at an unprecedented rate. Between April 
2008 and June 2009, it fell by 19 % in real 
terms. (20) This fall in world trade volume over the 
past year has been at a faster pace than during the 
first year of the Great Depression, when it 
declined by approximately 10 %. (21) In nominal 
terms, the decline in trade has been even more 
marked than in volume terms owing to an 
especially sharp contraction in commodity prices 
(see Graph II.1).  
The fall in trade has been highly synchronised 
across countries around the world. After having 
reached record levels in the first three quarters of 
2008, exports of many countries experienced 
losses of over 20 % (see Graph II.1). Asian 
countries were hit harder than countries from the 
Western Hemisphere or the European Union but 
have also seen a larger improvement of export 
growth since their respective troughs in exports. 
Asian countries were also among the first to 
report renewed export growth.  
                                                        
(20) See CPB Netherlands World Trade Monitor June 2009. 
(21) See Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009), ‘A tale of two 
depressions’, September 2009, VoxEU. 
Graph II.1: Developments in exports of selected 
countries, the euro area and the EU  
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(1) Real exports goods and services, National Accounts.
(2)  Difference between the maximum and minimum level of 
exports since 2008Q1. 
Source: Commission services. 
For 2009 as a whole, projections are for the 
steepest fall in world trade volume since the Great 
Depression. In its Spring Forecasts, the European 
Commission projects world exports to decline by 
11.5 % in 2009. The IMF predicts a fall of 11 % 
and the OECD 13 %. (22)(23) 
                                                        
(22) IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2009. 
(23) OECD Economic Outlook, March 2009. 
World trade has fallen at an unprecedented rate in the past year, declining much faster than world economic 
activity. Although global trade tends to be more volatile than economic activity, the slump in world trade over 
the past quarters has been particularly marked, suggesting that special factors have been at play. The most 
important factors appear to be the fact that the crisis has hit particularly hard the industrial sector and the 
components of demand with high import content, the reduced availability of trade finance, and the 
internationalisation of production. A factor that also seems to have played a role is the rise in transportation 
costs.  
The slump in world trade has led the G-20 to put in place a multilateral trade finance initiative worth USD 250 
billion. G-20 Leaders have also reaffirmed their commitment to open markets and trade, refraining from 
protectionism.  
The deep fall in trade had a strong impact on the euro area. Euro-area exports fell in line with falling trade 
activity worldwide but there were large differences between Member States. These differences stem to a large 
extent from differences in the product structure of exports.  
Recent data point towards stabilisation of world trade flows. This raises hopes that trade can be a supporting 
factor in the recovery. Although short-term prospects for the euro-area export markets are rather subdued, 
structural factors might play a supporting role in the recovery. 
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Why trade has historically been more volatile 
than economic activity in global downturns 
Both the recent and projected fall in world trade is 
much larger than that of world output, which the 
IMF expects to decline by 2.5 % in 2009. In 
general, trade tends to be more volatile than 
global output. Trade openness ratios (24) tend to 
rise during expansionary phases of the world 
economy and decline during global downturns. 
Graph II.2: World trade developments  
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This volatile nature of trade can be seen in 
Graph II.3, which shows developments in the 
world’s output and trade over the last three 
decades. Trade’s volatility in global downturns 
can typically be attributed to several factors.   
Firstly, trade falls more than economic activity 
because tradable goods, which include a relatively 
high share of capital goods and durable consumer 
goods, have a higher income elasticity than non-
tradable goods and services. A fall in income, 
therefore, affects the external sector of the 
economy more than it affects domestic demand, 
where the share of services tends to be much 
higher. 
Secondly, while foreign trade statistics account 
for the value of each transaction (e.g. the various 
parts of a vehicle), GDP data only measure the 
value added (e.g. assembling the vehicle). The 
internationalisation of production over the past 
decades has helped trade grow faster than GDP 
because of this difference in measurement. In a 
global downturn, particularly in a severe and 
synchronised downturn such as the current one, a 
disruption of the global supply chains can make 
                                                        
(24) The openness ratio is defined as the sum of exports and 
imports divided by the level of GDP. 
trade fall faster than income. Box II.1 explains the 
workings of this statistical factor in more detail.  
The third reason why trade is more volatile than 
GDP is the tendency towards a strengthening of 
protectionist policies during downturns. During 
downturns, governments are more inclined to 
introduce or increase trade barriers to protect 
domestic industries, preferring short-term benefits 
over the longer-term benefits of open trade. 
Finally, although this applies only to the 
behaviour of trade measured in nominal terms, 
another reason why global trade tends to 
decelerate more markedly than world GDP is the 
sharp drop in energy prices that is generally 
associated with economic downturns. Fluctuations 
in energy prices in response to demand shocks are 
exacerbated by the relatively low price elasticity 
of energy supply. The prices of other international 
commodities and, in some cases, of traded 
manufactured goods also tend to decline during 
global recessions, further contributing to this 
effect. 
Graph II.3: World trade growth and world 
output growth (y-o-y % change, 1980-2008) 
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The recent fall in world trade has been without 
precedent 
Trade is not only more volatile than output 
developments, for the reasons mentioned above, 
but the relationship between output and trade 
developments has changed through the years. The 
elasticity of trade to GDP has roughly doubled 
since 1960 (25) and tends to rise in times of 
worldwide economic downturns compared to 
more stable times. Trade growth is estimated by 
                                                        
(25) See Irwin, D., A. (2002), ‘Long-run trends in world trade and 
income’, World Trade Review 1: 1, 89–100. 
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Freund (2009) (26) to drop between 3.5 and 5 
times as much as GDP in times of worldwide 
economic distress. Recently estimated standard 
trade models based on high demand elasticities, 
however, predicted a smaller decline in global 
world trade than actually occurred. (27)  
                                                        
(26) Freund, C. (2009), ‘Demystifying the collapse in trade’, 
VoxEU, 3 July 2009. 
(27) Econometric trade models such as those estimated by the 
OECD (see N. Pain, A. Mourougane, F. Sédillot and L. Le 
In previous global downturns, growth in world 
trade volume on average came to a standstill or  
                                                                                  
Fouler, 2005, ‘The new OECD international trade model’, 
OECD Economics Department Working Paper No 440) and 
the ECB (G. Fagan, J. Henry and R. Mestre, 2001, ‘An area-
wide model (AWM) for the euro area’, ECB Working Paper 
No 42) relate trade flows to demand (foreign and domestic) 
and relative prices. Despite their relative high demand 
elasticities, these models predict, based on the observed fall 
in output, a less pronounced decline in trade flows in the last 
quarter of 2008 than actually took place. 
 
 Box II.1: The internationalisation of production and the income elasticity of world trade
It is sometimes argued that the internationalisation of supply chains and the development of intra-industry trade 
tends to increase the income elasticity of world trade. This is based on the fact that GDP is measured by the value 
added within a country while trade flows are measured by the full value of an item as it crosses the national borders.  
By splitting up production between different countries, the internationalisation of production may lead to a larger 
expansion in world trade than in world GDP because, while the latter only rises by the new value added, world trade 
increases by the total value of (intermediate) products crossing the border.  
However, although this argument can help explain why trade in absolute terms may show larger fluctuations than 
output it can only explain trade’s more volatile rates of growth to the extent that new supply chains are developed 
during upswings or disrupted during downturns.  
An example may clarify this. The building of a car requires the extraction of ore (value added of 10), its smelting 
into iron (value added of 10) and the assembly of the car (value added of 10). Total value added is 30. However, if 
these processes were carried out in different countries and the cars exported for sale to another country, total world 
trade would add up to 60 (10+20+30). 
If an extra production phase was added to improve efficiency or save costs, this would have a relatively small effect 
on value added but a very large effect on world trade. For instance, if the body of the car was to be moulded in yet 
another country (for instance a new production phase having an output worth 25), world trade would increase by the 
total value of the intermediate product (25, to reach 85 in our example) while the total value added would increase 
only by the efficiency gain (say, a gain of five percent between the second and third stage or 10*0.05=0.5). This 
would have a dramatic effect on the estimation of the income elasticity of world trade (world trade would increase 
by 25 while total value added would increase by only 0.5, implying an income elasticity of 50). 
However, to the extent that the international production chain is not affected by output developments, the 
globalisation of production cannot explain why the observed volatility of world trade growth is higher than that of 
world output.   
Assume that after the internationalisation of the production chain mentioned in the previous paragraph, world 
production declines by 10% (or by 3 in absolute terms). Assuming the new supply chains are not disrupted, although 
world trade would decline by 6 in absolute terms (twice as much as world GDP) in relative terms it would fall also 
by 10% (see table below). The income elasticity of world trade would, therefore, equal unity. 
 Ore extraction Smelting Assembly Total 
GDP/value added 10 10 10 30
World trade 10 20 30 60
GDP -10%  
GDP/value added 9 9 9 27 
(= -10%) 
World trade 9 18 27 54 
(= -10%) 
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fell slightly. The only global downturn for which 
records are available and which shows a fall in 
world trade similar to that of the current crisis was 
the Great Depression. In this focus section, the 
analysis is concentrated on the main global 
downturns of the past four decades. Table II.1 
shows the developments in world trade and world 
output in the global downturns of 1975, 1982, 
1991, 2001 and 2009. (28) 
A useful way to compare the behaviour of world 
trade relative to world output in the five 
recessions under analysis is to look at trade 
openness ratios. As in previous downturns, world 
trade was more volatile than world GDP, leading 
to a fall in the openness ratio. Also, investment 
was more volatile than both GDP and world trade 
(reflecting the very high income elasticity of 
capital goods).  
Another similarity that can be drawn between the 
current crisis and the earlier ones is that they were 
all preceded by a sharp increase in oil prices. The 
terms of trade shock associated with the increase 
in oil prices contributed to triggering the 
downturn (in oil-importing countries) and, 
                                                        
(28) Worldwide business cycles over the past four decades have 
been analysed by the IMF in its World Economic Outlook of 
April 2009. The IMF identifies four years during which the 
global economy was in recession (1975, 1982, 1991 and 
2009). In the present study, 2001 is also considered as a year 
of global downturn. In 2001, poor economic growth in the 
advanced economies was compensated by better growth 
performance of the developing economies (especially in 
Asia). However, since part of the strong growth experience in 
these Asian countries can be attributed to the recovery from 
the Asian crisis and since world trade did fall in 2001, that 
year may still be considered as a major downturn year. 
indirectly, the deceleration of world trade. In 
addition, it caused a rise in transportation costs 
that may have exacerbated the subsequent fall in 
world merchandise trade. Even though most 
downturn episodes were subsequently 
accompanied by a downward correction in oil 
prices (the 1975 downturn being the exception), 
there may have been lagged effects from their 
previous rise, particularly since oil prices often 
did not return to levels that prevailed during the 
period of economic expansion (see Graph II.4). 
As discussed below, the delayed effect of the 
sharp increase in oil prices may have played a 
significant role in the current crisis. 
Graph II.4: Oil prices and trade volume 
averages in the 1982, 1991, 2001 and 2009 
downturns (t = year of trough, annual basis) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Notwithstanding the common elements, there are 
some important differences between the current 
and the previous downturns. First of all, the 
decline in global trade has been much more 
 
Table II.1: Trade and other economic developments during global downturns  
(annual change in % unless otherwise indicated) 
1975 1982 1991 2001 2009F
Openness ratio (1) (2) -2.8 -4.3 -3.2 -4.5 -13.7
    GDP growth (3) 1.9 0.7 1 1.5 -2.5
    Output gap (3) n.a. -2 0.4 0.2 -3.3
    Investment (% of GDP) (3) -2.5 -3.7 -3.2 -2.6 -6
    Consumption (% of GDP) (4) 2.1 1.6 0.1 1.1 2.5
    Growth in world trade (1) -7.6 -2.3 0 -3.2 -18.5
    Duration of fall in trade (quarters) 4 4 0 4 2
    Rise from trough to peak before crisis 135 291 103 173 366
    Rise in year preceding downturn 159 -3 69 23 77
    Rise in three years preceding downturn 213 138 81 58 135
World GDP developments
World trade developments
World oil price developments (5)
(1) Decrease from peak quarter to trough quarter; (2) Based on IMF data and smoothed over two quarters; (3) IMF WEO April 2009; (4) 
OECD countries average; (5) Quarterly figures. 
Source: Commission services based on Reuters, EcoWin and IMF. 
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marked this time around. While in previous 
downturns, the decline in global trade volume 
never exceeded 7½ % (in fact, in the 1991 
downturn world trade growth did not become 
negative at all), world trade volume is estimated 
to have declined by nearly 20 % in the current 
crisis (between the third quarter of 2008 and the 
second quarter of 2009). 
In previous downturns, the world trade volume 
would return to its previous peak level within two 
quarters. In the current downturn, this is likely to 
take considerably more time. Assuming pre-crisis 
growth rates for trade flows, which were already 
high by historical standards, it would require more 
than three years in order to return to the pre-crisis 
level. More importantly, as shown by Table II.1, 
the average openness ratio has fallen by far more 
than in the previous downturns. This means that 
not only has trade declined more deeply but the 
decline has been more pronounced relative to 
deceleration in economic activity when compared 
to previous global downturns. This suggests that 
special factors may have been at work during the 
current downturn. 
Graph II.5: Openness ratios of emerging and 
advanced economies (% of GDP, six months 
moving average, Jan 1980 to Feb 2009) 
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Source: Commission services based on IMF data. 
One key development of the past two decades has 
been the rapidly rising integration of emerging 
market economies into the world economy. Since 
1991, while the openness ratio of advanced 
economies has risen by 2.5 percentage points of 
GDP, that of emerging market economies has 
increased by 11.5 percentage points. Trade among 
emerging market economies increased even more 
dramatically, leading to approximately a tripling 
of their intra-regional trade ratios (measured in 
per cent of their GDP). This process further 
intensified between 2001 and 2008 (see 
Graph II.5).  
This trend towards rising international integration 
of emerging market economies prevailed over the 
temporary and cyclical declines in openness ratios 
(or the de-globalisation process) that accompanied 
the global downturns. In the downturns of the past 
two decades, the openness ratios of emerging 
market economies have tended to be much less 
affected than those of advanced economies, 
reflecting their strong secular trend towards 
stronger international (and in particular intra-
regional) integration. This phenomenon is also 
apparent during the current downturn, with the 
openness ratios of emerging market economies 
holding up better than those of advanced 
economies. 
What factors may have made this cycle 
exceptional? 
All in all, the current development in world trade 
stands out from previous global downturns with 
respect to its high elasticity to income, the 
severity of the contraction and its expected 
duration. Although research into the reasons for 
these extreme developments is still ongoing, 
several factors have been put forward to explain 
the current slump in world trade. Most of the 
factors that are discussed below were also at work 
in previous trade cycles but their influence may 
have been different in the current global crisis. 
Composition of supply and demand effects 
In this economic and financial crisis, the industrial 
sector has been particularly hard hit. (29) This 
partly reflects its relative high dependence on 
capital, given that the financial system debacle 
has severely affected the availability of credit to 
finance capital spending. With manufactured 
goods typically being tradable goods and 
accounting for a higher share of total exports than 
services, this appears to be an important 
explanation for the particularly strong impact of 
this crisis on trade flows. As Graph II.6 shows, 
trade in goods has been more seriously affected 
during the crisis than trade in services. This crisis 
resilience of services trade is in line with the 
findings of Borchert and Mattoo (2009). (30)  
                                                        
(29) Global industrial production is projected to contract by 6.3 % 
in 2009, compared to an average of 2 % in the downturns of 
1975, 1982 and 1991. See World Economic Outlook, Spring 
2009, Box 1.1, pp. 11-14, IMF. 
(30) Borchert, I. and A. Matto (2009), ‘The crisis-resilience of 
services trade’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
No 4917, April 2009. 
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Graph II.6: Trade in goods and services during 
this global downturn  
(q-o-q growth in %, 2008Q1-2009Q1) 
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Source: Commission services based on OECD data. 
This resilience of services trade to the current 
crisis is also consistent with the fact that countries 
that rely more on manufacturing goods for their 
export performance (e.g. Germany, some Eastern 
European countries, Japan and some other Asian 
economies) have witnessed the biggest falls in 
export volumes during the crisis. By contrast, 
countries that are relatively less dependent on 
exports of manufactured goods and where 
services account for an important share of foreign 
exchange receipts (e.g. India) have been relatively 
less affected as far as their export performance is 
concerned. 
In addition to these so-called supply composition 
effects, there may be some demand composition 
effects helping to explain the relatively strong 
impact of the current downturn on trade flows. 
Graph II.7 displays the short-term correlation 
between imports and the three main expenditure 
components of GDP: investment (gross fixed 
capital formation), private consumption and 
government consumption. It shows that 
investment has the highest correlation with 
imports, followed by private consumption and 
then by public consumption. This reflects their 
respective import contents.  
In this crisis, there has been a marked shift from 
high import content components of demand (in 
particular investment) to low import content 
components (government consumption), for two 
reasons. Firstly, in comparison with previous 
downturns this crisis has had a particularly strong 
impact on investment demand (IMF (2009), op. 
cit.). Secondly, it has been accompanied by an 
exceptional counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus by 
most G-20 countries.  
Graph II.7: Short-term correlations between 
imports and expenditure components of GDP 
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Source: Commission services. 
Because the approved fiscal stimulus packages 
take time to fully kick in, part of this demand re-
composition effect is still to come. In other words, 
because of its relatively low import content, the 
fiscal stimulus provided to the domestic economy 
is unlikely to boost trade by the same magnitude 
as GDP in the coming quarters. This could 
moderate the response of trade flows to the 
recovery of economic activity, keeping the 
income elasticity of trade at a relatively low level 
for some time. 
Trade finance 
Directly related to the financial crisis is another 
important factor that has affected world trade: the 
reduced availability of trade finance. In the 
current global economic and financial crisis, trade 
finance has been reported as a constraint by 
companies. In a survey on the availability and 
pricing of trade finance, the IMF found that the 
decrease in the value of trade finance had 
accelerated between October 2008 and January 
2009. (31)  
The survey confirmed the increase in the cost of 
trade finance instruments (particularly for export 
credit insurance, which doubled in price between 
October 2008 and January 2009 after the 
significant increase already recorded between 
October 2007 and October 2008). Another 
interesting finding of the survey was that after the 
initial months, the respondents increasingly saw 
the decline in the demand for trade finance, as 
opposed to constraints in the availability of credit, 
as the primary reason for the decrease in trade 
finance. The pricing of medium- and long-term 
                                                        
(31) IMF Finance and Development, March 2009. 
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lending had eased slightly between October 2008 
and January 2009 but remained above its October 
2007 level. Graph II.8 shows how the growth in 
insured trade finance decelerated during the crisis. 
Graph II.8: Insured export credit exposure  
(y-o-y % change, USD, 2007Q1-2008Q4) 
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Berne Union. 
In reaction to the shortage of trade finance, the G-
20 has put in place a multilateral initiative to 
foster the counter-cyclical availability of official 
trade finance, from bilateral and multilateral 
sources (see Box II.2). This includes a 
commitment reached at the G-20 London Summit 
of April 2009 to increase the availability of short-
term trade finance provided by G-20 countries and 
multilateral development banks by about USD 
250 billion. (32) 
Although it is still too early to assess the impact 
of these policy initiatives, according to a recent 
survey by the IMF and the Bankers Association 
for Finance and Trade, the availability of trade 
finance appears to have improved in recent 
months, although the evidence is still mixed. A 
stabilisation of the deterioration of trade finance 
availability would already be a strong 
improvement on the responses in March, when 
almost half of the banks surveyed expected a 
further deterioration. 
Internationalisation of production  
The internationalisation of production has, as 
noted, been a key characteristic of the past 
decades of globalisation. Strong growth in FDI 
and in trade in intermediate manufacturing goods 
                                                        
(32) The EU is one of the main contributors to this multilateral 
initiative, having pledged through its national official export 
credit agencies about EUR 100 billion to the short-term 
finance effort and also being active in the medium- and long-
term segment of the market. 
over the past decades indeed suggests that the 
internationalisation of production has become an 
increasingly important factor in world trade 
developments over the years. But only if 
international supply chains have been disrupted 
can this offer an explanation for the current trade 
slump.  
Graph II.9 portrays the rising importance of 
internationalised production over the past five 
decades, divided into the periods between the 
global downturns. Over the past five decades, on 
average global trade in manufacturing goods has 
risen faster than the production of these goods. 
This is often regarded as evidence of the 
internationalisation of production. The difference 
between trade and production has been the largest 
between 1983 and 2007, pointing to increased 
vertical specialisation of nations in the period 
preceding the current crisis.  
Graph II.9: Growth of global manufacturing 
trade and manufacturing production  
(average annual growth in %) 
0
2
4
6
8
10
1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2007
Trade in manufacturing Manufacturing production
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Another indication of the increased role the 
internationalisation of production plays is the 
strong increase in foreign direct investment. Since 
1983, world FDI inflows have more than 
quadrupled as a percentage of world GDP. This 
increase partly reflects the internationalisation of 
production as multinational companies 
increasingly divide global production between 
different countries and subsidiaries abroad. Global 
supply chains have been particularly vulnerable to 
the trade and financial shocks of this financial 
crisis. (33) In the global supply chain, the failure of 
one company has direct implications for all the 
other companies. It disrupts the supply higher up 
                                                        
(33) See, for instance, Yi, K-M. (2009), ‘The collapse of global 
trade: the role of vertical specialisation’, in Baldwin and 
Evenett (eds), ‘The collapse of global trade, murky 
protectionism, and the crisis: Recommendations for the G-
20’, a VoxEU publication. 
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in the production chain (towards the final product) 
while it leads to a fall in demand lower down in 
the supply chain (towards the less processed 
products). The payment disruptions associated 
with the financial and economic crisis, such as 
deferred payment or non-payment, limit the 
possibility of the other companies to finance their 
inputs, their sales and their investments. 
The higher international integration of the supply 
chain achieved during the last two decades leads 
to increased efficiency but it is also a transmission 
channel for trade and financial shocks. The 
fragility of the system increases with vertical 
specialisation as it increases complexity and 
interdependence. Specialisation, nonetheless, 
leads to higher productivity and higher welfare. In 
the case of serious and synchronised disruptions 
such as the current global crisis, an internationally 
segmented production chain may amplify those 
shocks, exacerbating negative impacts of the 
global downturn on global trade flows. 
Transportation costs 
When oil prices reached record highs in the 
second quarter of last year, analysts were worried 
that transportation costs would limit the expansion 
of world trade. CIBC World Markets (Rubin and 
Tal (2008)) made a rough calculation that the 
effect on trade of the oil price at USD 150 per 
barrel would be equivalent to the tariff rates 
prevailing in the 1970s. (34) 
Following the subsequent fall in commodity 
prices, this discussion has largely disappeared. A 
delayed effect of the oil price hike before mid-
                                                        
(34) Rubin, J. and B. Tal (2008), ‘Will soaring transport costs 
reverse globalisation?’, CIBC World Markets StrategEcon. 
 
 Box II.2: The G-20’s trade finance initiative
In response to the marked decline in trade finance that accompanied the crisis, G-20 leaders put in place a trade 
finance initiative at their London Summit in April. The initiative was aimed at making available through a variety of 
national and multilateral channels an extra USD 250 billion of short term trade finance as well as increasing the 
support to trade through medium- and long-term trade finance (1). This target has been met.  
The EU has been a key contributor to the G-20 trade finance initiative. EU official export credit agencies have 
contributed around EUR 100 billion (roughly USD 140 billion) to the short-term component of the initiative. And 
their medium- and long-term commitments have increased by 38% when compared to pre-crisis levels, with a 
particularly large increase in the second half of 2008. The EU has also established an information exchange and 
coordination mechanism on trade finance among its Member States and has flexibly interpreted state aid rules to 
facilitate their trade finance response. 
An important pillar of the trade finance initiative by G-20 leaders has been the strengthening of the trade finance 
facilities of the multilateral development banks. The IFC doubled the ceiling for the trade finance guarantees 
available under its Global Trade Finance Programme and established a sizeable Global Trade Liquidity Programme, 
including contributions from bilateral donors. The World Bank has also expanded the budget of its Trade 
Facilitation Facility and its Aid for Trade Initiative. EU Member States have supported the expansion of the World 
Bank's trade finance instruments. The regional development banks have also considerably strengthened their trade 
finance facilities.  
To address the lack of reliable data on overall volumes and costs of trade finance, the IMF and the Bankers 
Association for Finance and Trade have surveyed banks three times on trade finance developments starting in 
December last year. After the first survey showed a significant deterioration in the availability of trade finance and 
worsening of the conditions under which trade finance could be obtained, the outlook for trade finance appears to be 
stabilising or improving in the latest survey. However, as global trade flows appear to have stabilised and to be 
expanding again, demand for trade finance can be expected to pick up. With some fragility left in the banking sector 
and the need for expanding world trade to support a worldwide economic recovery, it is important that the 
guarantees for sufficient availability of trade finance remain in place until the real and financial economic 
developments return to normal. 
                                                          
(1) The USD 250 billion for short-term trade finance is the amount of extra trade that could be financed over a period of 2 years 
(2009-2010) with both credit guarantees and loans by rolling over four times USD 62.5 billion in short-term finance with an 
average maturity of 180 days.  
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2008 could, however, have exacerbated the 
observed decline in world trade. 
Although previous global downturns were 
preceded by marked increases in oil prices (see 
Graph II.10), the hike in oil prices that preceded 
this crisis was particularly pronounced and 
intensified in the three quarters immediately 
preceding the downturn. Between the second 
quarter of 2003 and the second quarter of 2008, 
the oil price jumped by nearly 370 %, with oil 
prices approximately doubling in the first half of 
2008 alone (see Table II.1). This increase is much 
more marked than the increases (from trough to 
peak) in oil prices seen before the other 
downturns.  
Graph II.10: Oil price and openness ratios  
(March 70 to June 2009) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The effect of the large oil price increase on 
transportation costs was exacerbated by the 
scarcity of capacity. For instance, after a 400 % 
increase in the three preceding years, freight rates, 
as measured by the Baltic Dry Index, peaked in 
the first half of 2008. The increase in the non-
energy component of transportation costs during 
these last three years contrasted with the decline 
in these costs in the preceding decades. This 
decline was, among other things, due to 
economies of scale (i.e. increased size of ships) 
that also lead to higher fuel efficiency. The 
increase in transportation costs should surely be 
expected to have had some lagged impact on trade 
in the subsequent quarters and to be another factor 
that can explain the fall in world trade.     
There are several reasons why the effect of oil 
price increases works with a lag. First, it takes 
time before transport contracts are fully adjusted 
to the new reality. Secondly, even once contract 
prices adjust, it takes time for the resulting 
changes to have a full impact on trade flows, due 
to inertia in export and import contracts and 
practices. 
Simultaneous, widespread nature of global 
recession 
Trade is more volatile in widespread global 
downturns because of the more limited possibility 
to let external demand act as a shock absorber. 
Global downturns lead to a decrease in worldwide 
income and therefore affect all or most countries 
in the world. The drop in external demand can, 
therefore, not be compensated for by shifting 
markets, because demand is globally under 
downward pressure. This synchronisation may 
also help explain the slump in world trade. 
A discussion on the degree of ‘decoupling’ of 
emerging market economies from developments 
in advanced economies took place before the 
crisis and has resurfaced more recently. So far, no 
definite conclusion has been reached. What is 
clear, however, is that the current crisis has been 
highly synchronised and that its effects have been 
widespread. According to the IMF (IMF (2009), 
op. cit), the degree of synchronisation of the 
current recession is the highest of the last 50 
years, with a record number of advanced 
economies having entered into recession. 
Protectionist reactions 
Protectionist reactions are a potential threat to 
world trade developments. In the Great 
Depression, it was a policy reaction that led to 
deeper and prolonged economic fallout. Around 
the downturn of 1982 significant protective 
measures were also taken, such as voluntary 
export restraints and quotas on textiles and steel. 
In this crisis, however, protectionist measures 
seem to have been relatively limited so far, (35) 
which means that this is unlikely to provide a 
good explanatory factor for the relatively marked 
decline in world trade observed during this 
downturn. International peer pressure, in 
particular the standstill commitment agreed during 
the G-20 Washington Summit and the related 
monitoring mechanism put in place by the WTO, 
may have contributed to the restraint in installing 
protectionist policies.  
                                                        
(35) See Evenett, S.J. and B. Hoekman (2009), ‘Policy responses 
to the crisis: implications for the WTO and international 
cooperation’, VoxEU 6 July 2009. According to the authors, 
the amount of imports targeted by these measures is small 
and represents about 0.5 % of the merchandise imports of 
only G-20 countries. 
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Also, the interdependencies of economies through 
the global supply chain may have provided a 
disincentive to protectionist policies. As noted, 
inputs into the production process, in the form of 
imported intermediate goods, now form an 
important part of international trade. There is, 
therefore, little incentive for a country that is part 
of the global value chain to limit the import of 
intermediate goods or the final product. It would 
only endanger its share in the total value added. 
2. Impact on the euro area and its 
Member States 
The euro area was hit hard by the fall in world 
trade 
The euro area was severely affected by the slump 
in world trade. Euro-area exports of goods and 
services (based on National Accounts, comprising 
both intra and extra euro-area exports) fell in 
2008Q4 by 6.6 % compared to 2007Q4. The 
slump was even larger in 2009Q1 when exports 
fell further by 16.3 % y-o-y.  
Graph II.11: Euro-area exports of goods 
(y-o-y % change, 2001Q1 to 2009Q1) 
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Intra euro-area
Extra euro-area
Source: Commission services. 
Intra euro-area trade was very weak already since 
mid-2007, i.e. the first wave of the financial crisis. 
Extra euro-area exports kept pace till mid-2008 
thanks to robust exports to Eastern Europe and 
other emerging markets. At the turn of the year 
exports to the euro area as well as outside 
slumped in parallel, with the fall in extra euro-
area exports being marginally larger in 2009Q1 
(see Graph II.11 and Table II 2). 
Exports to almost all markets fell, but the scale 
of the fall was uneven 
Almost all euro-area export markets have been 
affected by the economic crisis. The European 
markets, both EU and non-EU, seem to be the 
main cause of the recent fall in euro-area exports. 
This is due to these countries’ large share in euro-
area exports and the large financial and economic 
turbulences experienced by most of them, 
especially in Eastern Europe. Among the EU 
markets, exports to Baltic countries suffered most 
but exports to other EU countries also recorded 
large drops. Exports to the UK, the single biggest 
trade destination, fell by 22.7 % in 2009Q1.  
 
Table II.2: Euro-area export growth to various 
destinations (y-o-y % change) 
2008Q4 2009Q1
Intra euro-area -11.5 -19.9
Extra euro-area -7.2 -22.0
Non-euro area EU -11.6 -23.7
UK -13.3 -23.4
CEE-5 (1) -8.1 -23.4
EFTA -4.6 -10.9
CIS -5.7 -37.6
Russia -5.6 -38.1
Africa 9.6 1.0
North America -12.9 -24.3
US -14.2 -25.3
Latin America 6.8 -24.7
Middle East (2) 4.1 -17.7
ASEAN (3) -4.9 -18.5
Japan -7.1 -26.0
China (4) -8.0 -15.6
India -24.7 -23.9
Australia and Oceania 10.9 -22.8
OPEC 16.1 -5.9
(1) Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania; 
(2) Israel, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Iran; (3) 
Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam; (4) 
Including Hong Kong. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Among the non-EU European countries, exports 
fell dramatically to countries hard hit by the crisis, 
such as Ukraine, Russia and Turkey. Other 
destinations have, on average, experienced lower 
falls in exports, but large differences exist even 
within narrow geographical regions. In North and 
South America, exports to the US and Argentina 
suffered significant drops, while shipments to 
Canada, Brazil or Mexico were much more 
resilient and weakened only in 2009Q1. Similar 
differences were recorded in South-East Asia, 
although the whole region was hit already in 
2008Q4. Africa as a whole is the only 
geographical region to which exports were still 
growing, even if only marginally in 2009Q1. This 
resilience seems to be mainly due to fast growing 
exports to oil and other raw materials exporting 
countries. The link between export resilience and 
commodities is supported by the behaviour of 
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exports to OPEC. Exports to OPEC were record 
high in 2008Q4 and decelerated only in 2009Q1, 
but the growth was still positive. However, also 
within OPEC, performance of individual countries 
was uneven, with the exports slowdown driven by 
the more open and developed OPEC members. 
Graph II.12: Exports of goods and services, euro 
area: results of estimations  
(y-o-y % change, 1990Q1 to 2009Q1) 
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Source: Commission services, National Accounts data. 
Are these developments in external demand 
sufficient to explain the precipitous fall in euro-
area exports? A standard export equation is a 
useful tool to answer this question. (36) The results 
of the estimation presented in Graph II.12 show 
that the fall in euro-area exports is in line with 
past relationships between exports, world trade 
and the exchange rate. Although a negative 
residual is visible in 2009Q1, its size is not very 
large compared with the past. 
Differences between various components of 
exports were significant  
As mentioned above there were noticeable 
differences in trade developments between goods 
and services trade. This can also be seen in euro-
area exports. Although in the past there has not 
been any systematic difference between export 
growth of goods and of services, services proved 
much more resilient during this slowdown (see 
Graph II.13). Nevertheless, the mitigating role of 
services was rather limited for the euro area, as 
services exports account for only 20 % of total 
exports. Although goods as a whole recorded a 
                                                        
(36) For a presentation of and more details on a euro-area export 
equation see QREA Volume 6 No 2 (2007). The estimates 
presented here are based on a sample 1989Q1-2008Q3 with 
2008Q4 and 2009Q1 being out-of-sample forecasts. The 
estimated equation has the following form: 
       ∆log(X)=0.80∆log(world trade)-0.33(log(X)+0.96log(world 
trade) +0.27log(reer))-1+2.13. 
steep fall, the breakdown of data into various 
goods sectors reveals significant differences (see 
Table II.3). Exports of food and beverages proved 
relatively resilient. At the same time, exports of 
raw materials and manufacturing collapsed.  
Graph II.13: Exports of goods and of services, 
euro area (y-o-y % change, 1999Q1 to 2009Q2) 
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Source: Commission services, National Accounts data. 
As raw materials are just a small part of euro-area 
exports, the manufacturing sector, due to its large 
share (45 % of goods exports), is the main cause 
of the fall in euro-area exports.  
 
Table II.3: Euro area exports of goods: sectoral 
breakdown  
(extra euro-area, y-o-y growth rate, volumes, in %) 
2008Q4 2009Q1
Food and beverages -0.6 -8.1
Raw materials -12.8 -21.1
Manufactured goods -8.8 -25
    Chemicals -5.8 -13.9
    Machinery and transport equipment -8.8 -29.3
Source: Commission services. 
 
Among various manufacturing sectors, machinery 
and transport equipment was one of the most 
severely affected. At the same time, it is the sector 
with the highest weight in euro-area exports, 
accounting for almost 22 % of the total. The 
widely reported difficult situation in the world 
automotive sector has left a visible trace in the 
export data. Exports in this sector, accounting for 
almost 10 % of total euro-area goods exports, fell 
by 40 % in 2009Q1 (in nominal terms). Chemicals 
exports were comparatively resilient among 
manufacturing goods and this was entirely due to 
exports of pharmaceutical products. 
Large differences recorded by Member States  
A look at export developments at the level of 
individual Member States reveals significant 
differences (see Graph II.14). On the one hand, 
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exports (goods and services) from Slovakia and 
Finland fell by almost ¼ (y-o-y) in 2009Q1, while 
Ireland’s exports slid by just 3 %. 
Graph II.14: Exports of goods and services, euro-
area Member States (intra and extra euro-area 
exports, y-o-y % changes) 
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Sources: Commission services, National Accounts data.
 
Source:  
Graph II.15: Correlation between growth in 
exports and in foreign demand  
(y-o-y % change, 2009Q1, exports of goods) 
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(1) Foreign demand is calculated as weighted average growth of 
goods imports in main exports markets. 
Source: Commission services, CPB Netherlands. 
Graph II.15 shows that it is difficult to relate these 
large differences to differences in country-specific 
external demand. The differences in external 
demand developments were very small compared 
to differences in exports and the correlation 
between the two variables was low at the turn of 
the year. It follows that other factors must have 
stood behind the large dispersion in Member  
States’ export developments. It has been shown 
above that individual components of exports 
recorded different developments recently. The 
product structure of exports is therefore a 
potential explanatory factor behind differentiated 
export developments of euro-area countries.   
Although goods exports account for the bulk of 
total euro-area exports, on a Member State level 
the situation differs. Services constitute more than 
half of total exports in Luxembourg and Greece 
and reach as much as 85 % in Cyprus. In contrast, 
in Slovakia and Germany, services exports are 
just around 10 % of the total. Moreover, some 
countries experienced rather different 
developments in terms of goods and services 
exports (see Graph II.16).  
Graph II.16: Exports of goods and services, euro-
area Member States  
(y-o-y % change, 2009Q1) 
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Although in most of the countries services were 
more resilient than goods, Greece, Luxembourg 
and Slovakia break this pattern. The cause of the 
fall in services exports in these three cases can be 
directly related to the characteristics of the 
ongoing crisis. Exports of services in Greece and 
Slovakia are concentrated in transport and their 
fall is the inevitable corollary of the slump in 
world trade. Luxembourg is heavily specialised in 
financial services and the fall in exports can be 
linked to the contraction of financial market 
activities. On the other hand, the resilience of 
services exports in Germany, the Netherlands and 
especially in Austria stands out. As trade statistics 
are less detailed for services than for goods, it is 
difficult to attribute this resilience unambiguously 
to a particular sector, but all of the countries 
where services exports have proved resilient 
exhibit a relatively high share of business 
services, including IT services. 
Member States’ export structure differs 
considerably if goods exports are considered. 
Graphs II.17 and II.18 illustrate the influence of 
the sectoral specialisation of exports on the 
differences in export developments between 
Member States. Graph II.17 shows that a higher 
share of manufacturing goods and raw materials 
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can on average be associated with a larger fall in 
exports. The reverse is true for chemicals. Graph 
II.18 confirms that the larger the share of 
chemicals in the export basket, the lower the fall 
in total exports.  
Graph II.17: Share of manufacturing and raw 
materials and export growth, euro-area  
Member States (1) 
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(1) The share of manufacturing less chemicals and raw materials 
(i.e. SITC sectors 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8) in total exports of goods based 
on trade statistics. The growth rate of goods exports, y-o-y, 
2009Q1, is based on National Accounts data. 
Source: Commission services. 
Graph II.18: Share of chemicals and export 
growth, euro-area Member States 
(in %, 2009Q1) (1) 
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(1) The share of chemicals (SITC 5) in total exports of goods 
based on trade statistics. The growth rate of goods exports, y-o-y, 
2009Q1, is based on National Accounts data. 
Source: Commission services. 
The reasons for Ireland’s remarkably resilient 
exports become clear. Ireland’s exports are highly 
concentrated in the chemicals sector and 
especially in pharmaceutical products (20 % of 
goods exports in nominal terms). This export 
structure explains the resilience of its exports and 
its far-off position in Graphs II.17 and II.18. (37) 
The results of this analysis mean that sectoral or 
product developments of world trade determined 
to a large extent the export performance of euro-
area Member States during this period of the 
global downturn. 
Short-term prospects 
After the dreadful trade developments at the turn 
of the year, the most recent high-frequency trade 
data have shown some signs of stabilisation. 
Month-on-month growth rates of world trade have 
in fact been broadly flat already since February 
and jumped by almost 2.5 % (m-o-m) in June. 
Stabilising world trade and economic activity in 
the world economy raises hopes that trade will be 
a supporting factor in the recovery. However, 
economic forecasts show that prospects for the 
world economy are uneven among regions.  
The prospects for euro-area's export markets, the 
US and Japan in 2010 are summarised in Graph 
II.19. The prospects for euro-area external 
demand are subdued compared with the US and 
Japan. Japan’s exports are best placed to benefit 
from the ‘growth engine’ in South-East Asia due 
to its high concentration in this region. Although 
to a lesser extent, it is also the case for the US, 
which additionally is going to benefit from robust 
growth in Latin America. In contrast, the euro-
area’s exposure to these dynamic regions is only 
limited. Moreover, the situation in Eastern Europe 
— the euro-area’s traditional export market — is 
mixed, with some countries having been severely 
hit by the crisis. Last but not least, as almost half 
of euro-area trade is internal trade, the expected 
slower recovery in the euro area itself will weigh 
on euro-area exports.  
Looking beyond the short term, it seems that the 
crisis triggered adjustment processes in some of 
the euro-area’s important export markets, both 
inside (e.g. Spain) and outside the euro area (e.g. 
the Baltic countries). Because some of the past 
growth in these countries was related to increasing 
imbalances, overheating and asset bubbles, the 
adjustment might be protracted. Exports to these 
markets will probably not return to the growth 
rates seen before some time. Although it might 
not weigh too much on exports from the euro area 
as a whole, particular Member States, which in 
the past benefited from high imports in these 
                                                        
(37) After removing Ireland and Luxembourg from the sample R² 
remains unchanged in Graph II.17 and increases to 0.57 in 
Graph II.18. 
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markets, may now be faced with durably lower 
growth of foreign demand. 
Graph II.19: Export markets — 2010 growth 
forecast (percentage change on preceding year) 
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Source: Commission services based on IMF World 
Economic Outlook forecast, October 2009. 
Nevertheless, there are also upside risks to the 
scenario presented in Graph II.19. Similar to the 
situation during the downturn, export structure 
can play an important role in the recovery phase 
and favourable export specialisation can improve 
external performance. Trade activity may increase 
faster than output during the upturn, in the same 
way as it fell more in the downturn, giving a boost 
to the open euro-area economies. The sharp 
decline in manufacturing trade may also bring a 
more forceful upturn in the manufacturing cycle, 
granting some growth bonus to manufacturing 
sectors. Also, capital and investment goods, which 
usually gain more in recovery, may see stronger 
external demand.  
An interesting pattern of the recent trade 
developments in the euro area is that countries 
recording current-account surpluses saw a larger 
deceleration of their exports than the countries 
with current-account deficits. This feature, 
together with the contraction of domestic demand 
in deficit countries, brought about a significant 
correction in intra euro-area current-account 
imbalances. However, an externally driven 
recovery in the euro area can make this pattern 
partly temporary. More export-oriented Member 
States are likely to again benefit more 
from the upturn in trade. At the same time, those 
Member States where productive capacity was 
more oriented towards domestic demand may lag 
behind in the recovery.  
                                                              
Conclusions 
The slump in world trade at the turn of 2008 and 
2009 was unprecedented. Its depth and speed can 
be compared only to the developments in trade 
during the Great Depression. At that time, world 
trade spiralled down, smothered by a surge in 
protectionism. Fortunately, world policymakers 
drew the right conclusions from that experience 
and did not let protectionist tendencies emerge 
this time. The G-20 reaffirmed its commitment to 
open markets and trade, recognising its role in 
creating wealth in the world economy, especially 
in the poorest countries. The multilateral trade 
finance initiative helped to moderate problems 
with access to trade financing created by the 
turbulences in the financial sector.  
All these initiatives notwithstanding, the steep fall 
in world trade had serious repercussions for the 
euro area and its Member States. The euro-area 
economy, highly integrated with the world 
economy, saw its exports fall abruptly, in parallel 
with the trade activity worldwide. However, 
individual Member States have experienced quite 
differentiated reactions of their exports to falling 
foreign demand. The differences relate to a large 
extent to the product composition of the export 
basket, as there have been noticeable differences 
in developments of individual components of 
goods and services trade.  
Recent high-frequency trade data show some 
stabilisation or even a pick-up in world trade 
flows. This raises hopes that trade can again be a 
supporting factor in the future recovery. However, 
growth prospects for various regions of the world 
economy differ a lot. This translates into large 
differences between countries in the expected 
boost from the external sector. The euro-area’s 
export markets are forecast to lag behind its main 
competitors in the near future. The product 
structure of exports may to some extent mitigate 
these negative geographical factors during 
recovery. Nevertheless, large adjustment needs in 
some important euro-area export markets imply 
that some euro-area countries might for a long 
time face more sluggish foreign demand than was 
the case before the crisis.  
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